Critical Issues Affecting the Reliability and Admissibility of Handwriting Identification Opinion Evidence—How They Have Been Addressed (or Not) Since the 2009 NAS Report, and How They Should Be Addressed Going Forward: A Document Examiner Tells All by Sulner, Andrew
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018 8:04 PM 
 
631 
Critical Issues Affecting the Reliability and 
Admissibility of Handwriting Identification Opinion 
Evidence—How They Have Been Addressed (or Not) 
Since the 2009 NAS Report, and How They Should Be 
Addressed Going Forward: A Document Examiner 
Tells All 
Andrew Sulner 
I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 634 
II.THE NEED TO REPLACE THE SUPPOSED FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
SUPPORTING FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTISE WITH A 
MORE DEFENSIBLE SET OF PRINCIPLES BASED ON 
NEUROSCIENCE ...................................................................... 638 
A.  Handwriting Pattern Recognition—An Everyday 
Occurrence in the Life of the Ordinary Person ............... 640 
B.  Preliminary Observations on the Classification of 
Handwriting Forms ......................................................... 641 
C.  Principles of Human Motor Control Theory as the 
Foundational Basis for Forensic Handwriting Expertise 642 
1.  Complexity Theory as Applied to Handwriting ....... 642 
D.  Establishing Reliability by Demonstrating a Common Sense 
Justification for the Particular Task Performed by the 
Forensic Handwriting Expert .......................................... 644 
E.  Using Less Absolutist Propositions in Support of Forensic 
Handwriting Expertise .................................................... 646 
III.LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO KNOW (AND PRACTITIONERS 
NEED TO OBEY) THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
PERFORMING RELIABLE FORENSIC HANDWRITING 
EXAMINATIONS ...................................................................... 647 
A.  Suitability for Comparison and Presence of Sufficient 
 
 Principal Owner, Forensic Document Examinations, LLC, New York, New York, M.S. 
(Forensic Science), J.D., George Washington University, Diplomate and immediate past 
President, Board of Forensic Document Examiners, and past Chair, Jurisprudence Section, 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences.  I would like to thank Michael Risinger for his 
editorial and other assistance in the writing of this Article, and Edward Imwinkelried for 
helpful comments on the draft.   
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
632 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631 
Discriminating Writing Features .................................... 647 
B.  Adequacy of Exemplars Used for Comparison 
Purposes .......................................................................... 648 
1.  Contemporaneousness .............................................. 648 
2.  Representative (Randomly Selected) Exemplars—Not 
Self-Serving Exemplars “Cherry Picked” by a Writer 
Disavowing Authorship ............................................ 649 
 3.Obtaining and Examining Handwriting Exemplars from 
All Persons of Interest in a Limited Pool of Plausible Writers
 ........................................................................................ 649 
IV.LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO BE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON THE OPINIONS AND 
TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTS .............. 656 
A.  Sources of Cognitive Bias That Can Unduly Influence the 
Outcome of Forensic Handwriting Examinations .......... 656 
B.  Observer Effects: How Examiner Bias Can Unduly 
Influence Forensic Handwriting Expertise ..................... 659 
1.  Selective Exposure: Choosing Which Evidence to 
Examine .................................................................... 659 
2.  Selective Scrutiny: Selectively Evaluating Evidence in 
a Manner That Favors a Particular Outcome ............ 659 
3.  Overlooking Differences in Writing Features Due to 
Observer Effects from the Evidence Itself (“Familiarity 
Heuristic”) ................................................................. 660 
4.  Selective Stopping (“Rush to Judgment” Mindset) .. 662 
5.  Selective Reevaluation of Evidence and/or Revision of 
Findings .................................................................... 663 
C.  Recommendations (Proposed Solutions) for Minimizing 
Examiner Bias in Forensic Handwriting Investigations . 663 
1.  Considering the “Oppositional Hypothesis” First ..... 665 
2.  Considering Alternative Possibilities and Hypotheses 
(Playing the Role of “Devil’s Advocate”) ................ 666 
3.  Using the Fischhof Method to Compare Text-Based 
Writings That Appear Very Similar and as a “Self-
Review” of One’s Initial Observations ..................... 666 
4.  Using Institutional Debiasing Techniques: Context 
Management Protocols and Procedures .................... 667 
i.  Separating the Crime Laboratory or Evidence 
Analysis Function from the Police and Prosecutorial 
Functions ............................................................ 667 
ii.  Using Sequential Unmasking Procedures and Case 
Managers ............................................................ 667 
iii.  Using Exemplar (Evidence) Lineups and Blind 
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
2018] A DOCUMENT EXAMINER TELLS ALL 633 
Evidence Submission Protocols ......................... 668 
V.CASEWORK PEER REVIEWS: THE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THEY ARE 
AND AREN’T AND WHY DIRECT TESTIMONY ABOUT ANY 
REVIEW PERFORMED BY A NON-TESTIFYING EXPERT IS 
INADMISSIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW ................................... 671 
A.  Types of Casework Peer Reviews .................................. 671 
1.  Administrative Review ............................................. 671 
2.  Technical Review ..................................................... 671 
3.  Verification ............................................................... 672 
B.  To Verify or Not to Verify?—Should the “V” in “ACE-V” 
Be a Prerequisite to the Admissibility of Handwriting 
Identification Opinion Evidence? ................................... 674 
C.  Testimony About Peer Review(s) Performed by a Non-
Testifying Expert Constitutes Improper Bolstering and/or 
Inadmissible Hearsay ...................................................... 677 
VI.GATEKEEPING: TRIAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS ARE STILL LARGELY 
INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
UNRELIABLE OR EXAGGERATED EXPERT TESTIMONY .......... 685 
A.  The Responsibility of Gatekeepers Regarding Proffered 
Expert Testimony ........................................................... 686 
B.  Factors Relevant and Material to Properly Assessing the 
Reliability of Proffered Opinion Evidence Under Rule 
702 .................................................................................. 687 
C.  Court Decisions Illustrating Unreliable and Critically 
Flawed Testimony on the Part of Presumptively Well-
Qualified Handwriting Experts That Should Have Been 
Excluded by the Trial Judge ........................................... 688 
1.  Improper Methodology—Using Exemplar Signatures 
of a Remote Date to Support an Opinion of Forgery 688 
2.  Illogical (Unfounded) Conclusion—Unjustifiably 
Extrapolating from an Accepted Premise to an 
Unfounded Conclusion ............................................. 691 
i.  Incomparability of Writing Features: The 
Significance of the Questioned Hand Printing Being 
Unnatural Stick Printing and the Exemplars Being 
Natural Printing. ................................................. 694 
ii.  Distorting an Inconclusive Opinion in a Manner 
That Favors a Particular Outcome ...................... 695 
iii.  Misinterpreting Evidence or Providing Exaggerated 
Testimony to Support a Favored Outcome ......... 697 
3.  Improper Methodology—Relying Solely Upon Post 
Litem Motem Signatures Supplied by A Disclaiming 
Signatory to Support an Opinion of Forgery (the 
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
634 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631 
Almeciga case) .......................................................... 698 
VII.CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEEDING FURTHER 
ALONG “THE PATH FORWARD” ............................................. 700 
A.  What the Community of FDE Practitioners Needs to 
Do 700 
1.  Restate the Foundational Principles Supporting the 
Discipline of Forensic Handwriting Analysis as a 
Technical Skill .......................................................... 700 
2.  Develop More Robust and Transparent Best Practice 
Standards for Examining Handwritten Items and 
Expressing Opinions in Reports and Testimony ....... 701 
i.  Handwriting Examinations: The Need for Standards 
to Incorporate Practical Measures Designed to 
Reduce the Potential for Cognitive Bias ............ 703 
ii.  Handwriting Examinations: The Need to Delineate 
the Decision-Making Stages Involved in the 
Examination and Evaluation Process ................. 707 
iii.  Handwriting Identification Opinions: The Need to 
Establish More Meaningful and Appropriate 
Language for Expressing Qualitative Levels of 
Confidence (Certitude) ....................................... 709 
iv.  Support for and Cooperation with Properly 
Designed Black Box Studies .............................. 714 
B.  Lawyers and Gatekeepers Need to Be Better Informed and 
More Diligent in Scrutinizing an Expert’s 
Methodology ................................................................... 715 
1.  The Trial Lawyer ...................................................... 715 
2.  The Trial Judge ......................................................... 716 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 717 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the discipline of forensic document examination requires 
specialized knowledge with respect to paper, ink, printing methods, 
detecting alterations and page substitutions, deciphering indented writing, 
and other subject matters relevant to determining the authenticity or source 
of a given document, the bulk of a document examiner’s work involves 
comparison of handwriting of various kinds.  This Article will focus only on 
the handwriting comparison aspect of document examination since that is 
what has drawn the most attention and criticism with respect to issues of 
validity and reliability. 
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In writing this Article, it was not lost on me that the person whose career 
and contributions are being celebrated in this Symposium is more 
knowledgeable about forensic handwriting analysis than any other non-
practitioner and, regrettably, more knowledgeable than far too many 
practitioners of this discipline.  Many of Professor Michael Risinger’s 
contributions to the relevant literature are routinely cited by courts as 
authoritative references with respect to seminal issues pertaining to the 
validity and reliability of forensic handwriting analysis.1  I consider myself 
fortunate and privileged to be able to count Michael Risinger as a friend, and 
even more fortunate to have benefited from his wisdom and insight over 
many, many years.  His viewpoints and critical commentary, more than 
anything else, have shaped, and in many instances confirmed, my own views 
as a practicing forensic document examiner (FDE). 
By way of introduction, I am a third-generation FDE in private practice 
for more than forty years, who has also experienced the trials and tribulations 
of serving the public as a state prosecutor.  My education and training in the 
forensic sciences and the law was comprehensive and multifaceted.  It taught 
me how to think critically when evaluating data or evidence and to consider 
alternative possibilities, and it reinforced the importance of maintaining 
neutrality when embarking upon any truth-seeking endeavor.  In my chosen 
field of forensic science, I was fortunate to receive my principal training 
from an internationally recognized expert in forensic document examination, 
 
 1  See, e.g., D. MICHAEL RISINGER, Handwriting Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2d 
ed. 2002); D. Michael Risinger, Appendix: Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting 
Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2007); D. 
Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or, a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I 
Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic 
Science” in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 
43 TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007); D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, 
of the Boundary Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness 
Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV. 679 (2004); D. Michael Risinger & Mark P. Denbeaux, Kumho 
Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 15 (2003); D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & 
Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: 
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); D. Michael 
Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert 
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 
(2000); D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New “Post-
Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998); D. 
Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courtroom: Daubert 
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger, 
Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational 
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 
(1989).   
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Hanna F. Sulner, who happened to be my mother.2  I received supplemental 
training from a retired FBI document examiner and numerous other 
document examiners and forensic scientists trained in the public and private 
sectors in various continuing education programs over the years. 
Over the last twenty-five years, I have been actively involved in efforts 
to develop meaningful consensus standards establishing best practices and 
protocols for FDEs, especially with respect to the examination and 
comparison of handwritten items, and how the findings and opinions derived 
from such an examination should be expressed in reports and testimony.  I 
have also been active in exposing flawed and disingenuous testimony on the 
part of presumptively well-qualified FDEs and in seeking to develop 
practical measures and safeguards that would enhance the ability of FDEs, 
lawyers and judges to minimize, if not eliminate, inaccurate and unreliable 
opinion evidence from forensic handwriting analysis. 
This Article endeavors to improve awareness and enhance the legal and 
judicial responses to critically flawed evidence from handwriting experts by 
providing lawyers and trial judges with guidelines for determining when 
evidence from even presumptively well-qualified handwriting experts is 
unreliable and should be excluded. 
 
 2  Hanna F. Sulner received her training as a document examiner in Europe.  From the 
age of 16, she studied at the elbow of her father, Professor Julius Fischhof, a pioneer in 
handwriting analysis who settled in Budapest, Hungary after World War I and won a 
reputation as Eastern Europe’s foremost expert on questioned documents.  She studied 
Criminology in Budapest and in Germany and received a special degree qualifying her to 
teach the subject of Questioned Documents at the University of Budapest law school.  Taking 
over her father’s work after his death in 1944, she quickly inherited his reputation as a 
meticulous professional as well as his position as official handwriting and document expert 
to Hungary’s courts, police, and military, which she held until February 6, 1949, when she 
and her husband, Laszlo, escaped to Austria with the aid of American and British intelligence 
agencies. Four days later, they surfaced in Vienna and achieved international notoriety by 
denouncing the February 1949 trial of Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty on treason and other 
charges as a farce, and by displaying microfilms of documents which they had smuggled out 
of Hungary and which revealed the Communist Government’s machinations to discredit and 
frame the Cardinal by forging his signatures on a purported confession and other incriminating 
documents. After immigrating to the United States, she promptly resumed her career as an 
examiner of questioned documents.  From 1950 until her death in 1999, Hanna F. Sulner 
worked in New York as one of the nation’s leading authorities on disputed documents, 
testifying in civil and criminal cases in various state and federal courts throughout the United 
States and elsewhere, rarely for the losing side. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Hanna F. 
Sulner, 81, Expert Drawn Into Mindszenty Plot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/19/us/hanna-f-sulner-81-expert-drawn-into-mindszenty-
plot.html?mcubz=3.  Her professional publications appeared in scientific and legal journals 
in Europe as well as in such noted American legal periodicals as the American Bar Association 
Journal and Criminal Law Review.  She authored a well-recognized 400-page reference book, 
DISPUTED DOCUMENTS: NEW METHODS FOR EXAMINING QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1966), and 
Forged, Altered and Substituted Medical Records, a comprehensive article that appeared in 
the October 1971 issue of Trauma, an authoritative Medico-Legal journal published by 
Matthew Bender & Co., New York.   
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Part II of this Article discusses the foundational tenets that have 
traditionally been espoused to support the discipline of forensic handwriting 
analysis, and why there is a need to replace those tenets with less absolutist 
statements derived from principles of neuroscience and human motor control 
theory. 
Part III provides an overview of the essential requirements for 
performing reliable forensic handwriting examinations, which lawyers and 
judges need to know and practitioners should adhere to.  A reported opinion 
from a case in which I was involved is used to illustrate the danger of tunnel 
vision in any forensic handwriting investigation (focusing only on the 
“target” of the investigation). 
Part IV seeks to illuminate the impact of cognitive bias on forensic 
handwriting analysis by discussing the biasing influences that can 
improperly taint and sway an examiner’s decision-making process and 
render unreliable his or her opinions and testimony, and by providing an 
overview of the various methods and techniques available for minimizing, if 
not eliminating, such adverse influences. 
Part V examines the three different types of forensic casework peer 
reviews (administrative review, technical review, and verification); it 
addresses the relevance of verification in evaluating the reliability of opinion 
evidence, and discusses recent case law explaining why testimony 
concerning any type of “review” performed by a non-testifying expert 
constitutes improper bolstering3 and/or inadmissible hearsay. 
Part VI discusses the gatekeeping obligation imposed upon trial judges 
to screen and exclude unreliable evidence proffered by handwriting experts, 
and what lawyers need to do, but all too often fail to do, to facilitate the 
judge’s role as gatekeeper.  Several appellate court decisions are reviewed to 
illustrate instances of unreliable handwriting identification opinion evidence 
that escaped recognition and successful challenge at the trial level, as well as 
one recent district court case in which the proffered testimony of a 
handwriting expert was properly excluded by the gatekeeper. 
 
 
 3  Generally, a party may not bolster or support the credibility of its witness until that 
credibility has been affirmatively impeached by the opposing party, and even then, it can only 
do so with evidence that does not violate the hearsay rule.  See generally EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, FREDRIC I. LEDERER & LIESA 
RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 702 (6th ed. 2016).  As discussed in Part V.C, 
infra, several court decisions have held that a witness’s testimony about casework peer review 
by someone not testifying is inadmissible on the ground of “improper bolstering” of the 
credibility of a witness on direct examination in advance of any attack on the witness’s 
credibility.  However, I am grateful to Professor Edward Imwinkelried for pointing out that 
the more appropriate legal basis for excluding such attempted corroboration testimony would 
be hearsay outside of any hearsay exception.   
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Finally, Part VII concludes with my thoughts and perspectives on what 
can and should be done to further enhance the reliability of handwriting 
identification opinion evidence that is presented in civil and criminal cases.  
This Part also discusses what can and should be done to remedy the 
inequality of resources in criminal cases that effectively deprives defendants 
and their counsel of the ability to acquire the expertise needed to properly 
expose flaws and weaknesses in opinion evidence proffered by prosecution 
handwriting experts. 
II. THE NEED TO REPLACE THE SUPPOSED FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
SUPPORTING FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTISE WITH A MORE 
DEFENSIBLE SET OF PRINCIPLES BASED ON NEUROSCIENCE 
Forensic document examiners (FDEs) have traditionally premised the 
claim of scientific validity and reliability of handwriting identification on 
two asserted principles or tenets: (1) handwriting is unique, meaning that no 
two people write exactly alike (the principle of Uniqueness or Inter-writer 
Variability); and (2) no person can produce an exact duplicate of his or her 
signature or write exactly the same way twice (the principle of Intra-writer 
Variability).4 
Given the strong form in which these two tenets are usually expressed, 
their absolute truth is by no means obvious (nor is it necessary for the process 
of handwriting analysis to yield probative and reliable results under many 
circumstances, as we will see).  But even assuming their truth, why does this 
establish the credentials of the process of handwriting identification as a 
science? 
I have always maintained, contrary to the position espoused by most 
FDEs, that handwriting identification is not a science, but a technical skill 
which, if performed properly, can have great probative value, for reasons I 
will go into later in this Article.5  Such views have long made me an outsider 
to the “guild” identified and described in 1997 by Professor Risinger and his 
 
 4   See, e.g., Diane Harrison, Ted M. Burkes & Danielle P. Sieger, Handwriting 
Examination: Meeting the Challenges of Science and the Law, FORENSIC SCI. COMMNC’NS 
(Oct. 2009), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/oct2009
/review/2009_10_review02.htm/.  These two tenets are sometimes supplemented by a third, 
that no person can exceed his or her writing skill level at a given point in time (the principle 
of Writer Skill Threshold Limitation), a principle which is virtually tautological, self-proving, 
and requires no validation.  However, it does not apply in the factual context of most cases, 
and does leave open the question of how to determine the skill level of both the questioned 
writing and the candidates for writership. Id.   
 5  When I so testified before U.S. District Court Judge Miriam Cedarbaum in Boulé v. 
Hutton, 138 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), Judge Cedarbaum interrupted my testimony to 
comment that during her career on the bench, she had heard testimony from many handwriting 
experts, and I was the first one to testify that handwriting identification was not a “science.”   
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coauthors.6  Now, however, my longstanding position that absolutist 
statements concerning uniqueness and intra-writer variability are as yet 
unproven, and likely unprovable, appears to be gaining more respectability 
as academic scientists examine the foundations of the traditional pattern-
matching forensic disciplines and come to broadly similar conclusions.  In 
addition, recent federal district court decisions excluding or limiting the 
proffered testimony of handwriting experts in criminal and civil cases have 
likewise concluded that regardless of whether handwriting analysis is 
characterized as science or technical skill, there has been inadequate testing 
and insufficient data to support the scientific validity of the two fundamental 
principles (Uniqueness and Intra-writer Variability) that have forever been 
espoused by virtually all FDEs as the underlying basis for handwriting 
identification. 
For instance, in the recent case United States v. Kelly,7 the handwriting 
at issue involved cursive handwriting.  In limiting the proffered expert 
testimony to a discussion of the expert’s methodology and the similarities 
and differences he observed in handwriting features, the court noted: 
 
In his testimony, Mr. Shiver stated that in order to definitively 
prove that no individual writes exactly like any other, one would 
have to collect the handwriting of every person. Mr. Shiver also 
stated that collecting such data is practically impossible.  The 
inability to prove this tenet with certainty does not in and of itself 
 
 6  Professor Risinger and his coauthors described the guild mentality in handwriting 
expertise circles in D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks & Mark P. Denbeaux, Brave New 
“Post-Daubert World: A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 408 
(1998) (commenting on Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the 
Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997)):   
Professor Moenssens seems to have a number of goals in his article: 
(1) to alert the reader to doctrinal differences and differences in training 
and experience among people called as handwriting experts in 
American courts; (2) to establish the superiority of one doctrine, one 
method of training, and one group; (3) to recapture the label of 
“science,” with its attendant rhetorical power, for handwriting 
identification, at least when undertaken by the right group; and (4) to 
guard against any residual risk that such disciplines might be found too 
unreliable to be the subject of testimony, first by trashing the credibility 
of critics by any available means and, second, by proposing a standard 
of “reliability” tailored both to insure admissibility and to establish his 
favored group as the monopoly guild.  Finally, the underlying hope that 
appears to be reflected in the Moenssens article is that, if the rest of 
these goals are accomplished, the practical effect will be to ensure that 
fact finders are not provided with any skeptical interpretation of either 
the methodology or the available validity data (or lack thereof) from 
any person not certified by the guild.   
Id.   
 7   United States v. Kelly, No. 4:15-cr-01632 (D. Ariz. 2015).   
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render Mr. Shiver’s identification opinion unreliable.  However, 
the two studies Mr. Shiver states support this tenet do not provide 
a sufficient basis for his opinion.  One study leads to the 
conclusion that within a sample of 1500 writers, very few write 
similarly; the other leads to the conclusion that handwriting is not 
determined by a person’s genetics.  Without more, this Court 
cannot conclude from these studies that there is sufficient data to 
support an identification opinion.8 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Johnsted,9 the proffered hand printing 
identification testimony of Gale Bolsover, a U.S. Postal Service FDE, was 
excluded in its entirety.  The court cited the following reasons for excluding 
the testimony: 
 
 The studies cited by the Government and its expert fail to 
support the principles of Uniqueness (Inter-writer Variability) 
and Intra-Writer Variability that are claimed as the 
foundational underpinnings of handwriting analysis.10 
 
 Bolsover conceded that she knew of no studies supporting the 
second foundational principle that no individual writes exactly 
the same way twice.11 
 
A. Handwriting Pattern Recognition—An Everyday Occurrence in 
the Life of the Ordinary Person 
While there has been some progress in accepting that the absolutist 
statements historically claimed as the foundational tenets of forensic 
handwriting analysis are not capable of empirical proof, there is still some 
resistance within the FDE community to abandoning these absolutist 
statements in favor of more modest, and more defensible, claims concerning 
the diagnosticity of handwriting comparison in regard to various different 
tasks which are presented in actual practice, based on a more nuanced 
understanding of such claims. 
Handwriting recognition is a phenomenon that ordinary people are 
invariably familiar with and routinely encounter in their daily lives, which 
renders it unlike any other forensic pattern recognition phenomenon.  
Common experience confirms that under some circumstances, we can 
 
 8  Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).   
 9  30 F. Supp. 3d 814 (W.D. Wis. 2013).   
 10  Id. at 822.   
 11  Id. at 818.   
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recognize a writer by means of visual cues appearing in his or her writing. 
Usually, such writing belongs to a relative, friend or co-worker whose 
writing pattern has been unconsciously stored and imbedded in the visual 
memory center of our brain after numerous viewings, and is thereafter 
subject to automatic recall upon viewing it again.  Presumably, for this 
recognition to be achieved, the brain is making decisions based on features 
that pictorially characterize the writing. For lay persons, this process is 
relatively straightforward as only a limited number of pictorial memories are 
in play and an incorrect judgment may have no adverse consequences. For 
forensic handwriting experts, every sample of handwriting presented, be it 
questioned or known, presents a set of handwriting features that are 
unfamiliar and have not been stored in the observer’s visual memory, which 
therefore requires methodical examinations of the sets of questioned and 
known handwriting independently to ascertain the features that characterize 
each set. 
B. Preliminary Observations on the Classification of Handwriting 
Forms 
There have been many systems proposed for the classification of 
handwriting, some quite elaborate, and often with different purposes in mind.  
These are well surveyed by Roy A. Huber and A. M. Headrick in their 
treatise Handwriting Identification: Facts and Fundamentals (1999).12  For 
this paper, it is best to stick to fundamentals.  Signatures are properly 
classified separately because they represent a special class of writing that is 
personal to the writer in many physical and emotional dimensions, and thus 
presents both special opportunities and special problems in determining 
whether a putative signature by a specified person was made by that person 
(is authentic13). Signatures may be text-based, stylized (symbolic); or mixed 
text-stylized. Non-signature generation of written letters has been described 
by Huber and Headrick as falling into four principle categories:  (1) Cursive 
writing, in which letters are connected; (2) “Manuscript” writing, in which 
letters are disconnected and are designed similar to upper and lower case 
printing characters; (3)  Hand lettering, sometimes called block printing or 
block lettering, in which letters are separately structured and often designed 
as upper case letters; and (4) Composites usually combining cursive writing 
and “manuscript” writing, with some letters connected and others not.14  It is 
 
 12  ROY A. HUBER & A.M. HEADRICK, HANDWRITING IDENTIFICATION: FACTS AND 
FUNDAMENTALS 152–60 (1999).   
 13  “Authenticity” in this context is a specialized type of writership attribution in which a 
signature is attributed to the person whose name or alleged stylization appears on the 
document.  A signature not attributed to that putative author is not authentic, or inauthentic.   
 14  HUBER & HEADRICK, supra note 12, at 95–101.   
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important to note here that it is quite common for a person’s ordinary hand 
to be manuscript writing, and quite uncommon for it to be hand lettering.  
Both of these, not being connected cursive, are often misleadingly lumped 
together as “hand printing” even though they present different sub-tasks 
from the standpoint of determining the sufficiency of features for purposes 
of writer attribution. 
C. Principles of Human Motor Control Theory as the Foundational 
Basis for Forensic Handwriting Expertise 
Handwriting is an over-learned skill that becomes automatic and 
habitual (it’s practiced until the writer “can’t get it wrong”). For example, 
the image of your signature and the specific movement sequence required to 
produce that image are imbedded in your brain’s motor control memory 
centers.  Hence, if you were to sign your signature in the air with your 
forefinger or foot acting as the writing instrument, your forefinger or foot 
would follow the same movement sequence that is followed when signing 
your name on paper with pen in hand.  Since handwriting is a behavioral 
artifact of the human motor control process, once you understand that 
process you can draw reasonable inferences from examining its byproduct. 
1. Complexity Theory as Applied to Handwriting 
Numerous human motor control studies conducted by neuroscientists 
have confirmed the difficulty of repeating or simulating a series of rapidly 
connected movements (“Complexity Theory”).15  As applied to handwriting, 
the following principles can be reliably stated: 
 
A. The more complex a handwriting sample is, the more difficult it becomes 
for others to simulate it without leaving behind tell-tale indicia of 
simulation (e.g., line tremor, unnatural pen lifts, gaps or hesitations, 
spatial and proportional disturbances). 
 
 
 15  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Brault & Rejean Plamondon, Complexity Measure of Handwritten 
Curves: Modeling of Dynamic Signature Forgery, 23 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS., MAN, & 
CYBERNETICS 400 (1993); Henry S.R. Kao, Daniel T.L. Shek & Elbert S.P. Lee, Control 
Modes and Task Complexity in Tracing and Handwriting Performance, 54 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 69 (1983); Ruud G.J. Meulenbroek, & Gerard P. van Galen, Perceptual-
Motor Complexity of Printed and Cursive Letters, 58 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 95 (1990); 
Ruldolf E. van der Platts & Gerard P. van Galen, Effects of Spatial and Motor Demands in 
Handwriting, 22 J. MOTOR BEHAV. 361 (1990); Gerard P. van Galen, Structural Complexity 
of Motor Patterns: A Study on Reaction Times and Movement Times of Handwritten Letters, 
46 PSYCHOL. RES. 49 (1984); Alan M. Wing, Response Timing in Handwriting, in 
INFORMATION PROCESSING IN MOTOR CONTROL AND LEARNING (George E. Stelmach ed., 
1978).   
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B. The more complex a handwriting sample, the more likely it will contain 
features that deviate from other writers.16 
	
C. The greater the number of times the pen is required to change direction, 
the longer the line length over which turning points occur, and the greater 
the overall speed of execution, the more complex the visual image 
appears. 
 
Empirical support exists for the above stated complexity theory 
relationships, and the assessment of the complexity of handwriting has been 
reported in related fields of research.17 Research studies have validated the 
ability of FHEs to evaluate the parameters that contribute to the perceived 
complexity of handwriting.18 
 
Examples of Signatures of Varying Complexity 
 
Three signatures of varying complexity (simple, moderately complex, 
and very complex) are displayed below: 
 
 
 
 16  This relationship is related to the theory of class and individual characteristics that has 
traditionally been offered as an underpinning for forensic handwriting identification.   
 17  Linda C. Alewijnse, C. Elisa van den Heuvel & Reinoud D. Stoel, Analysis of 
Signature Complexity, 21 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 37 (2011); See generally 
MICHAEL P. CALIGURI & LINTON A. MOHAMMED, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF HANDWRITING: 
APPLICATIONS FOR FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION (2012).   
 18  Bryan J. Found, Douglas Rogers & Robert Schmittat, Recovering Dynamic 
Information From Static Handwriting Traces Using Angular Differential Software, 6 J. 
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 17 (1997); Huub J.J. Hardy, Dynamics of the Writing 
Movement: Physical Modelling and Practical Applications, 5 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT 
EXAMINATION 1 (1992); Tahnee N. Dewhurst, Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, The 
Relationship Between Quantitatively Modelled Signature Complexity Levels and Forensic 
Document Examiners’ Qualitative Opinions on Casework, 18 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT 
EXAMINATION 21 (2007); Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, The Forensic Investigation of 
Signature Complexity, in HANDWRITING AND DRAWING RESEARCH: BASIC AND APPLIED ISSUES 
483–92 (Marvin L. Simner et al. eds., 1996); Emily J. Will, Pilot Study: Inferring Relative 
Speed of Writing From the Static Trace, 22 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 55 (2012).   
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Figure 1. Signatures of Varying Complexity 
 
The bottom two signatures in Figure 1 above belong to the star 
entertainer, Rihanna.  The first was signed early in her career, the second 
after she became an international celebrity.  Recognizing the inherent value 
of her signature on memorabilia, like many other sports and entertainment 
celebrities, Rihanna intentionally developed a highly complex signature to 
make it more difficult for would-be forgers to successfully simulate her 
signature. 
D. Establishing Reliability by Demonstrating a Common Sense 
Justification for the Particular Task Performed by the Forensic 
Handwriting Expert 
As discussed above, the reliability of forensic handwriting analysis 
cannot be predicated upon the uniqueness of handwriting.  Rather, it must be 
predicated upon (a) the perceptual ability of FDEs to observe and detect 
subtle similarities and differences between two sets of writings; and (b) their 
diagnostic ability to make reasonable inferences from such an analysis 
regarding the likelihood that the two sets of writings were written by the 
same or different writers. 
The standard for admissibility of proffered expert testimony varies 
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For the purposes of this Article, 
I will concentrate on admissibility criteria under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702.  For expert testimony to be admissible under FRE 702, the trial judge 
must have sufficient reason to believe that (a) the expert possesses sufficient 
skill in regard to performing a particular task at hand, and (b) reliable 
inferences can be drawn from the reliable performance of that particular task. 
Under FRE 702, as under Daubert and Kumho, trial courts must scrutinize 
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not only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether 
those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the 
case. Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case,19 and Kumho acknowledges that 
whatever the claim of expertise may be, when you’re dealing with skill 
claims, the belief warrant need not necessarily come from empirical testing.20  
A demonstrable critical common sense justification for a warranted belief in 
reliability supplants the need for independent black box or statistical 
validation studies, even though such studies are always preferable. 
The fact that the ordinary person is very familiar with handwriting and 
can easily understand the mechanism that produces it lessens the necessity 
for formal validation of a handwriting expert’s ability to make accurate 
decisions regarding signature authenticity or handwriting source 
attributions.21  Once you understand the mechanism by which a phenomenon 
is produced, you can readily see when an opinion based upon that mechanism 
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence under a common sense 
approach.  Critical common sense, the nature of the evidence being analyzed 
and characterized, and the ability of the ordinary person to comprehend and 
independently assess the expert’s characterization of that evidence provides 
a sufficient belief warrant for the validity of the characterization. For 
example, demonstrable evidence of shared characteristics between two sets 
of handwriting can provide a strong basis for a reasonable person to find that 
both sets of writings were made by the same person beyond a reasonable 
doubt.22 
Kumho Tire makes it clear that under the mandate of Daubert, 
evaluation must be directed to the reliability of the expertise in the specific 
“task at hand” at issue in the case.23 Let’s assume that the task at hand 
requires distinguishing natural writing tremor from faked (artificial) tremor 
in a questioned (disputed) signature. Let us further assume that the tremor 
observed in the stroke pattern of the known signatures of the subject writer 
 
 19  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).   
 20  Id. at 150.   
 21  See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The 
ability of juries to perform the crucial visual comparisons relied upon by handwriting experts 
cuts against the danger of undue prejudice from the mystique attached to ‘experts.’”). 
 22  “A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason, logic, common sense, or 
experience.  It is a doubt that an ordinary reasonable person has after carefully weighing all 
of the evidence, and is a doubt of the sort that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in 
matters of importance in his or her own life.  It may arise from the evidence, or from the lack 
of evidence, or from the nature of the evidence.” U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT,  MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.06 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ca3.uscourts.
gov/sites/ca3/files/2012 Chapter 3 Rev.pdf.   
 23  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.  See analysis in Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand,” 
supra note 1.   
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reflects wiggly and irregular strokes indicating the writer’s inability to 
control the writing instrument, whereas the tremor observed in the stroke 
pattern of the questioned signature reflects a series of concatenated sharply 
angled up and down strokes that look like shark’s teeth, indicating extreme 
control over the writing instrument. In this instance, the neuroscience of 
motor control provides an understanding of the mechanism that produces 
handwriting and a common sense justification for the inference that the 
questioned signature was written by someone who possessed motor control 
rather than someone who lacked it. 
E. Using Less Absolutist Propositions in Support of Forensic 
Handwriting Expertise 
As discussed above, the FDE community needs to abandon the theory 
of uniqueness as the underpinning for forensic handwriting expertise and 
replace it with a neuroscience model based upon human motor control 
behavior and complexity theory. More modest fundamental principles 
should be used as support for handwriting expertise, such as the following: 
 
(1) Given an adequate amount of skillfully executed, complex (non-
simplistic) writing, the likelihood that handwriting by different 
writers will be distinguishable from each other is far greater than 
the likelihood that handwriting by different writers will be 
indistinguishable from each other.24 
 
(2) The smaller the source population of possible writers, the greater 
the likelihood that a specific writer can be accurately identified as 
the source of the questioned writing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 24  In discussing the neurobiological principles underlying handwriting variation, and the 
principle that the more complex the writing, the harder it should be to simulate, and the less 
chance of mistaking it for another individual’s handwriting, the late Bryan Found, a 
pioneering Australian forensic document examiner (FDE) whose views were very much in 
line with mine, likewise asserted that “under normal conditions, given a sufficient amount of 
writings, no two skilled writers are likely to produce handwritten images that are exactly the 
same in terms of the combination of construction, line quality, formation variation and text 
structure features.” Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, A Consideration of the Theoretical 
Basis of Forensic Handwriting Examination: The Application of “Complexity Theory” to 
Understanding the Basis of Handwriting Identification, 4 INT’L. J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT 
EXAMINERS 109 (1998).   
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III. LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO KNOW (AND PRACTITIONERS NEED 
TO OBEY) THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING 
RELIABLE FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXAMINATIONS 
A. Suitability for Comparison and Presence of Sufficient 
Discriminating Writing Features 
Handwriting is an acquired skill involving a multifaceted perceptual-
motor task in which neuromuscular commands direct a very complex set of 
coordinated movements of the fingers, wrist, elbow and shoulder. The 
discriminating features of writing include elements of style (e.g., letter 
formations, spatial and proportional relationships between letters and words, 
and formatting features) and execution (e.g., speed and fluidity of writing 
movements). It is the totality (combination) of the discriminating, habitual 
writing habits that forensic document examiners compare and evaluate in 
cases involving handwriting identification and/or signature verification. 
Essentially, the pictorial, structural and line quality features that are 
perceived to characterize two sets of writing specimens are independently 
assessed and then compared inter se to determine whether they are 
sufficiently similar to support the hypothesis of common authorship or 
sufficiently dissimilar to support the hypothesis that different writers 
produced the two sets of writings. 
At the outset of any handwriting investigation, the examiner makes 
value judgments about whether the questioned writing is sufficiently devoid 
of distortion or disguise to render it suitable for comparison purposes, and 
whether it contains enough distinguishing features to support a decision 
regarding source attribution.25 Such judgments are discretionary and 
examiner dependent. 
Once the questioned writing is adjudged to be suitable for comparison 
purposes, the examiner then evaluates the quantity and quality of the 
exemplar (known) writing to assess its adequacy for comparison purposes. 
Let us consider signatures first.  To determine whether a questioned 
signature is genuine, a trained forensic handwriting expert focuses on the 
intricate details that make up the component (structural) parts of the 
signature and the relative speed and fluency (rhythm) with which those 
details are executed. An attempt to duplicate the signature of another person 
based upon a known sample or “model” of that person’s signature is referred 
to as a forgery by simulation or simulated forgery.  In so doing, the forger 
attempts to duplicate the normal and natural writing habits and abilities of 
 
 25  In the case of the first (top) signature displayed in Figure 1, supra, it is so simplistic 
that a would-be forger would have little difficulty producing a simulation that would escape 
detection as a forgery.  Hence, any conclusion concerning the authenticity of such a simplistic 
signature should be considered unreliable and of no probative value.   
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another while simultaneously discarding his or her own customary writing 
habits and abilities. 
A skilled signature, be it text-based, stylized, or a combination of both, 
is the product of a series of concatenated curvilinear strokes. The number of 
times the writing instrument is required to change direction and the relative 
orientation of the curvilinear strokes within a given signature establish its 
complexity. To imitate the precise writing movements so as to accurately 
replicate the combination of curvilinear strokes found within a complex 
signature of another person and to do so with the same relative speed of 
execution and fluency found within that other person’s genuine signature(s) 
is a task that is extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve. Hence, the 
greater the complexity of the handwritten image, the more difficult it 
becomes to successfully simulate it. Essentially, the difficulty encountered 
in copying complex movements is the cornerstone of forensic signature 
analysis. 
B. Adequacy of Exemplars Used for Comparison Purposes 
Obtaining an adequate number of samples of an individual’s normal 
writing is an essential requirement in investigating whether or not such 
individual authored a questioned or disputed handwritten item; these samples 
are termed exemplars.  The exemplars must be sufficient in quantity to 
provide a sound basis for evaluating and ascertaining the natural range of 
variation found within the subject individual’s handwriting or signature 
pattern.  Variations found within the same person’s writing or signature 
pattern are often referred to as “intra-writer” differences, whereas “inter-
writer” differences refer to dissimilarities that are attributable to another 
writer.  In any case involving questioned writings or disputed signatures, the 
critical task for the forensic document examiner is to ascertain whether 
apparent differences are intra-writer differences indicative of common 
authorship, or inter-writer differences evidencing different writers. The 
significance of the essential requirements of this task will be highlighted in 
one or more of the illustrative cases discussed later in this Article. 
1. Contemporaneousness 
Perhaps the most important factor in assembling good exemplars is 
contemporaneousness. Ideally, the exemplars should be written as close as 
possible to the alleged date(s) of preparation of the questioned writing(s).26  
 
 26  The ideal exemplars for handwriting comparisons are contemporaneous normal course 
of business writings that conform to the same format and context as the questioned material, 
i.e., prepared in the same writing style (cursive or printed), and containing the same characters, 
letters, or words. The textual format of the exemplar writing needs to be similar to that 
encountered in the questioned writing so that the examiner is “comparing apples to apples.” 
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Contemporaneousness of the exemplar writing is particularly critical in those 
instances where the examiner bases his or her opinion upon dissimilarities 
observed between the questioned and exemplar writing. Best practices 
require contemporaneous exemplars for comparison purposes because they 
tend to be far more representative of the subject’s writing habits and skill at 
the time the questioned item was purportedly written; as the time gap 
between the exemplars and the questioned writing becomes greater, the 
exemplars have the tendency to be less representative and more unreliable.  
Hence, it should come as no surprise that a principal source of error in 
disputed signature cases is when the handwriting expert bases an opinion of 
forgery on exemplar signatures of a remote date or on an inadequate amount 
of exemplar signatures. 
2. Representative (Randomly Selected) Exemplars—Not Self-
Serving Exemplars “Cherry Picked” by a Writer 
Disavowing Authorship 
Best practices also require experts to reduce the likelihood that the 
exemplar writing submitted to them for comparison purposes is self-serving 
and not representative of the full range of writing features attributed to a 
specific writer.  For example, in a disputed signature case, if the process by 
which exemplar signatures are selected permits a disclaiming signatory to 
“cherry pick” the exemplars to be supplied for comparison purposes, the 
selection process itself is tainted and inherently unreliable. The selection 
process must allow for the random selection of exemplars to reduce the 
likelihood that exemplars were selected with the intent to provide spurious 
support for an unmeritorious claim of forgery. In many signature comparison 
cases, upon obtaining a truly representative sampling of the disclaiming 
party’s signature pattern, what at first glance were perceived as “apparent 
differences” are oftentimes demonstrated and proven to be “normal 
variations” within the same person’s signature pattern (intra-writer 
differences), and hence prima facie proof of genuineness. 
3. Obtaining and Examining Handwriting Exemplars from All 
Persons of Interest in a Limited Pool of Plausible Writers 
One of the cardinal sins committed in a forensic handwriting 
investigation is to perform one-to-one comparisons between the handwriting 
appearing in a questioned item and only the exemplar writing attributable to 
the “suspect” or “target of the investigation,” especially when there exists a 
limited pool of plausible writers. As a general principle, every effort should 
 
The ideal exemplars for signature comparisons are signatures executed on a date 
contemporaneous with the date of the questioned or disputed signature, and preferably on 
documents of similar import and under comparable circumstances of execution.   
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be made to keep the examiner “blinded” from learning the identity of the 
suspect in a handwriting investigation as such contextual information can 
unconsciously influence the perception and decision-making of the 
handwriting expert, as described in Part IV of this Article.  The need to 
examine writing samples from others in the “web” of plausible writers 
should be self-evident: it facilitates keeping the examiner blinded to the 
“suspect” or person of greatest interest; it enables the examiner to see if other 
writers display writing features similar to those observed in the questioned 
writing(s); and it can serve to eliminate individuals as the writer of the 
questioned writing. This is particularly important in cases involving hand 
printing, which may not be as distinctive as cursive writing. 
Early in my career, shortly after I stopped working as a state prosecutor 
for the Queens County District Attorney’s Office, I was hired as a forensic 
document examiner in what proved to be a case that attracted a lot of local 
media coverage and reinforced my conviction that FDEs involved in 
forensic handwriting investigations should always be required to examine 
writing samples from other plausible writers or persons of potential interest, 
and, to the extent possible, be precluded from receiving any case 
information that is irrelevant to the handwriting comparison task they are 
being asked to perform until the task is completed. 
The case involved a high profile disciplinary hearing in which the 
Westchester County Division of Public Safety charged Police Officer 
William P. Shaughnessy with serious misconduct that could have led to job 
termination as well as future criminal charges. John D. Ryan, a former New 
York State prosecutor, was officially appointed as Special Hearing Officer 
to hear and evaluate the evidence and report his findings and determination.  
It was alleged that between February and December of 1981, Shaughnessy 
was part of a conspiracy in which approximately two hundred (200) mail 
subscription forms were fraudulently completed in the names of several 
police officers and their spouses, resulting in hundreds of books and 
magazines being sent to their homes and offices. Two of Shaughnessy’s 
superior officers, Lt. Stephen Fischer and Sgt. James Fleming, received 95 
and 78 such unsolicited mailings, apparently in retribution for their 
involvement and cooperation in the so-called “cooping investigation,” a 
clandestine NYPD Internal Affairs investigation of police officers sleeping 
on the job, which resulted in charges being brought against twenty-two (22) 
police officers and a great deal of unwanted media attention. 
Shaughnessy was charged with the intent to defraud, harass, annoy, and 
alarm others by falsely and fraudulently completing approximately ten of 
these mail subscription order forms, eight in the name of Stephen Fisher and 
two in the name of James Fleming. Far more serious was the allegation that 
Shaughnessy and his co-conspirators cut the lug-nuts on Lieutenant 
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Fleming’s personal automobile, which resulted in a near fatal accident on 
April 3, 1981, when the left rear tire fell off while Fleming was driving on a 
highway. Fleming testified that at around that same time, while at the office 
of their same personal attorney on separate business, Fleming and 
Shaughnessy had a conversation in which Shaughnessy expressed an opinion 
that the mailings would never stop.  Fleming was involved in the cancellation 
of over 200 unsolicited mailings as well as the procedure utilized with 
respect to forwarding evidence to the postal authority’s crime laboratory. He 
enjoyed a friendly working relationship with Terry Loftus, the Postal 
Inspector assigned to investigate the unsolicited mailings, having worked 
with him for five years on stolen welfare check cases. Fleming was also 
aware that Police Officer Robert Duncan was separately indicted in 
connection with the cooping investigation and had pled guilty. 
Shaughnessy, a recipient of the Bronze Medal of Honor for military 
service in Viet Nam, was not indicted or even considered a suspect in the 
cooping investigation. He adamantly denied writing, in whole or in part, any 
mail subscription forms, all of which contained alphanumerical hand 
printing. There was no eyewitness account of Shaughnessy’s involvement in 
any of the activities with which he was charged, and no admissions of any 
kind were made by him. As noted in the published decision of Special 
Hearing Officer Ryan, “[t]his case turns on a proper analysis of the expert 
testimony submitted by each party,”27 and “the testimony of each 
handwriting expert was . . . , without a doubt, the most significant and 
probative part of this case.”28 
The County’s handwriting expert was Carl J. Raichle, a presumptively 
well-qualified FDE employed by the U.S. Postal Crime Lab in New York 
City.29 Mr. Raichle’s initial report, dated February 8, 1982, was based upon 
his examination and comparison of the hand printing appearing in the ten 
questioned mail subscription forms that Shaughnessy was charged with 
writing and the known hand printing of Shaughnessy appearing in his memo 
book and personnel folder. In this report, Mr. Raichle concluded that 
Shaughnessy wrote seven out of the ten subscription forms at issue and that 
 
 27  In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *28 (Westchester Cty., N.Y. 
Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983). 
 28  Id. at *36.   
 29  Mr. Raichle earned a B.S. in Police Science from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 
trained four years in the New York City Police Department Crime Lab’s Questioned 
Documents Unit, attended FBI and U.S. Secret Service specialized courses, and was 
employed as a forensic document examiner by the New York City Police Department Crime 
Lab for four years and the U.S. Postal Crime Lab for six years.  He was certified by the 
American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) and testified approximately 
thirty times in state and federal court. Id. at *15–16.   
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“it is conceivable that Shaughnessy wrote [the other three].”30 
Thereafter, Mr. Raichle requested and received request (demand) 
exemplars that Shaughnessy provided to Postal Inspector Loftus following 
Mr. Raichle’s first report. No other writer’s exemplars were submitted to or 
requested by Mr. Raichle.  Based upon these additional Shaughnessy 
exemplars, Mr. Raichle issued his second report, dated June 10, 1982, which 
now concluded that Shaughnessy wrote each of the ten mail subscription 
forms he was charged with writing. 
Mr. Raichle had also received a packet from Lt. James Fleming that 
contained samples of P.O. Garret Morrison’s hand printing. Fleming 
submitted these additional hand printing exemplars to Mr. Raichle because 
Shaughnessy had claimed that his and Morrison’s hand printing were 
similar.31  Mr. Raichle acknowledged that he never compared Morrison’s 
hand printing to the hand printing on the questioned mail subscription forms 
because Shaughnessy had already been identified as the author of the 
forms.32 
Nearly a year after issuing his second report, Mr. Raichle received for 
analysis 10 additional mail subscription forms that Shaughnessy was not 
formally charged with writing. This resulted in Mr. Raichle issuing a third 
report, dated June 21, 1983, in which he concluded that at least four different 
writers completed these ten additional mail subscription forms and that 
Shaughnessy wrote four of them. 
I was formally retained as a handwriting expert on behalf of 
Respondent Shaughnessy in late December 1982. From the very start, I 
insisted on obtaining exemplar hand printing from all the police officers in 
Shaughnessy’s unit, including supervisory personnel, and that I be supplied 
with all the mail subscription forms analyzed by Mr. Raichle. The fact that 
Mr. Raichle never insisted on examining writing exemplars from writers 
other than the charged party (Shaughnessy) was shocking to me given that 
standard protocol (best practices) in any anonymous handwriting 
investigation requires doing so. Sadly, thirty-five years later, this case still 
serves as an excellent learning tool for experts, lawyers and judges because 
it illustrates the importance of examining handwriting exemplars from all 
 
 30   Id. at *16.   
 31   During the investigative phase of the case, Police Officer Garrett T. Morrison, who 
had access to the records and reports of various police officers, was shown each of the ten 
original subscription forms at issue and denied authorship of each.  At trial, Morrison 
appeared under subpoena as a witness for Respondent Shaughnessy. When offered the 
opportunity by Respondent’s attorney to provide handwriting exemplars, Morrison refused to 
do so without a court order upon the advice of counsel. Id. at *20.   
 32   This is a prime example of target shifting and selective stopping.  Morrison’s 
handwriting was not compared to the questioned handwriting because the target, 
Shaughnessy, was already identified.   
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persons of interest when dealing with a limited population of plausible 
writers and the dangers inherent in examining only those written by the prime 
suspect in the investigation. This case also demonstrates the need to erect a 
“Chinese wall” between the expert analyzing the evidence and the 
investigator handling the case. 
My analysis of the hand printing at issue revealed numerous significant 
dissimilarities between the hand printing in question and the known hand 
printing of Shaughnessy. These differences were readily observable when 
reviewing either the post litem motem request exemplars provided by 
Shaughnessy or his normal course of business exemplars that pre-dated the 
case (ante litem motem exemplars). My opinion and testimony was that there 
was absolutely no evidence that Shaughnessy wrote any of the ten 
subscription forms he was charged with writing or that he wrote any of the 
ten uncharged subscription forms, four of which Mr. Raichle attributed to 
Shaughnessy.  I further testified and demonstrated that four of the ten 
charged forms were written by Patrick Duncan (who had already been 
criminally convicted for his involvement), another two appeared to have 
been written by Duncan, and the remaining four contained significant 
similarities to the hand printing of Police Officer Garrett Morrison, and were, 
beyond all doubt, not written by Shaughnessy.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33  “Mr. Sulner, due to lack of sufficient available exemplars from Morrison, would not 
positively identify Morrison as the author of these items.  However, he did testify that due to 
the number and probative weight to be assigned to the numerous similarities, any indication 
of authorship is on Morrison.  Shaughnessy, he testified, is, beyond all doubt, not the author.” 
In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *25 (citations omitted).   
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The chart below indicates which of the salient features of the 
questioned hand printing were found by Mr. Raichle to be similar or 
dissimilar to the hand printing features of Shaughnessy (the only writer 
whose hand printing he compared). 
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The chart below reflects my findings regarding the distribution across 
three writers (Shaughnessy, Morrisown and Duncan) of the same slient hand 
printing features.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results obtained from my examination of exemplar writings from 
writers other than just the target (suspect) made it clear that more of the 
salient features were found in the writings of Morrison and Duncan than in 
Shaughnessy’s.34  This, coupled with my testimony as to the significant 
 
 34  The reader is referred to the decision In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 
3, (Westchester Cty., N.Y. Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983), for a detailed analysis of the 
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dissimilarities between Shaughnessy’s hand printing and the questioned 
hand printing, is what enabled the trier of fact to reject the testimony of the 
government’s expert and conclude: 
 
I must concur with the findings of Mr. Sulner. Aside from the 
similarities in the “L” in “Police,” there do not appear to be any 
significant similarities in the questioned writings and those of P.O. 
Shaughnessy. The numerous distinctions between the two (2) sets 
of writings compel the conclusion that Shaughnessy was not the 
author of the questioned writings.35 
 
IV. LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO BE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON THE OPINIONS AND 
TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTS36 
A. Sources of Cognitive Bias That Can Unduly Influence the 
Outcome of Forensic Handwriting Examinations 
Contextual bias is the most common form of cognitive bias encountered 
in forensics. It occurs when potentially biasing background information that 
is irrelevant to the discipline-specific task assigned to an examiner (e.g., 
examining and comparing handwriting) is conveyed to the examiner before 
the examiner has completed the task and reached a conclusion. It is not 
uncommon for forensic document examiners to be “briefed” about the 
background of the case surrounding the document(s) being submitted to 
them for forensic handwriting analysis.37 Such extraneous information 
usually suggests the outcome preferred or desired by the party requesting the 
analysis, and consequently, has the potential to unduly influence and distort 
the examiner’s visual perception and evaluation of the handwriting evidence 
submitted. In the law enforcement or criminal justice setting, potentially 
biasing information usually concerns the crime itself, the criminal 
background of the suspect, or knowledge of a confession or some other form 
of physical or testimonial evidence linking the suspect to the crime. 
 
 
handwriting evidence presented in this case, particularly with respect to the handwriting 
features that the government’s handwriting expert mischaracterized as “significant” 
similarities attributable to Shaughnessy.   
 35  In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *47–48 (Westchester Cty., N.Y. 
Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983).   
 36  The material in Part IV originally appeared in Andrew Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive 
Bias, in WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 1–15 (Allan Jamieson & Andre 
Moenssens eds., 2014).   
 37  Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need For Procedural 
Changes, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407 (1984).   
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The idea that document examiners should be insulated from all 
information about an investigation except necessary, domain-specific 
information is not novel. William E. Hagan’s 1894 treatise on the 
examination of disputed handwriting and signatures contained the following 
commentary highlighting the need to keep document examiners “blinded” 
from such biasing influences: 
 
[T]he examiner must depend wholly upon what is seen [in the 
forensic examination], leaving out of consideration all suggestions 
or hints from interested parties; and if possible it best subserves 
the conditions of fair examination that the expert should not know 
the interest which the party employing him to make the 
examination has in the result. Where the expert has no knowledge 
of the moral evidence or aspects of the case in which signatures 
are a matter of contest, there is nothing to mislead him, or to 
influence the forming of an opinion; and while knowing of the 
case as presented by one side of the context might or might not 
shade the opinion formulated, yet it is better that the latter be based 
entirely on what the writing itself shows, and nothing else.38 
 
Motivational bias on the part of forensic experts can be attributed to a 
variety of factors, and research on motivated reasoning has shown that an 
individual’s reasoning processes are more readily biased when the individual 
is motivated by goals other than accuracy.39  Wharton provides the following 
commentary regarding motivational bias on the part of handwriting experts: 
 
It is well known that in cases of peculiar difficulty, when the 
difference, if there be any, between two handwritings is only 
noticeable by perceptions, the most sensitive experts, no matter 
how conscientious, often take unconsciously such a bias from the 
party employing them as to give to their judgment the almost 
infinitely slight impulse that turns the scale; nor is it strange that, 
in an instrument so delicate, aberrations from its true course 
should be produced by attractions or repulsions otherwise 
unappreciable. If an expert could be absolutely secluded from 
such extraneous influences, his judgment might be depended on 
at least for impartiality. This, however, is impracticable. A jury is 
bound, therefore, to accept the opinion of an expert as to 
handwriting, even when uncontradicted, as an argument rather 
 
 38  WILLIAM E. HAGAN, A TREATISE ON DISPUTED HANDWRITING AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF GENUINE FROM FORGED SIGNATURES 82 (1894).  
 39  See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 25 
(2012) (citing Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 480 
(1990)). 
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than a proof; and to make allowance for all the disturbing 
influences by which the judgment of the expert may be moved. 40 
 
Wharton’s view of when the judgments of handwriting experts are most 
vulnerable to bias is confirmed by psychological research indicating that 
forensic practitioners are less likely to be swayed by potentially biasing 
influences when the evidence is clear-cut and unambiguous.41  Simply put, it 
is far more difficult to rationalize a desired outcome in the face of very 
strong, if not irrefutable, evidence to the contrary. 
Contextual and motivational influences can produce confirmation bias, 
the tendency to seek out and interpret evidence in ways that support or 
confirm pre-existing beliefs and desires.  Conflicts between truth-seeking 
goals and outcome-oriented goals are often fueled by the adversarial nature 
of the legal process itself.42  The 2009 NAS Report43 and research studies44 
indicate that forensic practitioners assigned to evaluate evidence may be 
motivated to see their side of a case prevail, which can lead them to endorse 
a biased view of the evidence that is consistent with their adoption of an 
adversarial, outcome-oriented role instead of an objective truth-seeking one.  
Moreover, “tough-on-crime” attitudes prevalent within the law enforcement 
community tend to foster confirmation biases that leave prosecutors, 
investigators, and forensic specialists in crime laboratories more inclined to 
prioritize the value of obtaining a conviction of the accused over the 
countervailing priority of protecting the accused from a wrongful 
conviction.45  These potentially biasing influences render handwriting and 
 
 40  FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES 711–
12 (3d ed. 1888). 
 41  See SIMON, supra note 39, at 25 (citing Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Pär Anders 
Granhag, The “Elasticity” of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigative Bias, 22 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL., 1245 (2008); Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts 
Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006)).  
 42  See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic 
Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 (2008).  
 43  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 122–24 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/n
ij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter 2009 NAS REPORT].   
 44  See SIMON, supra note 39, at 26 (citing Dan Simon, Doug Stenstrom & Stephen J. 
Read, On the Objectivity of Investigations: An Experiment (Aug. 18, 2008), https://papers.ssr
n.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130103).   
 45  See, e.g., Stephen B. Perrot & Donald M. Taylor, Attitudinal Differences Between 
Police Constables and Their Supervisors: Potential Influences of Personality, Work 
Environment, and Occupational Role, 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 326, 333–37 (1995) 
(explaining that levels of authoritarianism views differ between constables and supervisors); 
Richard K. Wortley & Ross J. Homel, Police Prejudice as a Function of Training and 
Outgroup Contact: A Longitudinal Investigation, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1995) 
(explaining that police prejudices vary according to policing experiences); Karl Ask & Pär 
Anders Granhag, Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations: The 
Need for Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 43 (2005).   
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other forensic experts vulnerable to making erroneous decisions about the 
evidence they evaluate. 
Absent the implementation of practical bias minimizing procedures 
when evidence is submitted to and evaluated by handwriting experts in civil 
or criminal cases, it is unlikely to expect such experts to be kept “blinded” 
from domain-irrelevant information or other potential biasing influences.  
Some of the recommended changes that have been proposed for minimizing 
bias in handwriting investigations are discussed below in Part V.C. 
B. Observer Effects: How Examiner Bias Can Unduly Influence 
Forensic Handwriting Expertise 
 Observer effects refer to the ways in which an examiner’s perception and 
interpretation of evidence can be influenced by the examiner’s preconceived 
beliefs and motives, or by the surrounding context, which can include 
background information conveyed to the examiner as well as the evidence 
itself, the latter being a phenomenon often overlooked. Examiner bias in 
forensic handwriting investigations can influence how examinations and 
comparisons are performed, the visual perceptions and observations of the 
examiner, the findings and opinions drawn from evaluating and comparing 
questioned and known writings, and the manner in which the examiner 
testifies in court. Some of the mechanisms and mental processes by which 
such cognitive bias can operate are discussed below. 
1. Selective Exposure: Choosing Which Evidence to Examine 
 Observer effects refer to the ways in which an examiner’s perception and 
interpretation of evidence can be influenced by the examiner’s preconceived 
beliefs and motives, or by the surrounding context, which can include 
background information conveyed to the examiner as well as the evidence 
itself—the latter being a phenomenon often overlooked.  Examiner bias in 
forensic handwriting investigations can influence how examinations and 
comparisons are performed, the visual perceptions and observations of the 
examiner, the findings and opinions drawn from evaluating and comparing 
questioned and known writings, and the manner in which the examiner 
testifies in court.  Some of the mechanisms and mental processes by which 
such cognitive bias can operate are discussed below. 
2. Selective Scrutiny: Selectively Evaluating Evidence in a 
Manner That Favors a Particular Outcome 
 A handwriting expert’s selective scrutiny of evidence occurs when the 
expert searches only for evidence that will confirm the expert’s favored 
outcome.  An example would be where a handwriting expert’s favored 
outcome is common authorship and in the course of examining the evidence, 
the expert’s attention is disproportionately focused on looking for 
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similarities in writing features between the questioned and exemplar writing, 
thereby failing to meaningfully search for or recognize the presence of 
differences in writing features between the two sets of writings. As discussed 
in Part IV.B.3, the Fischhof Method of upside-down writing comparison 
developed by my grandfather in the early 1900s can help to minimize the 
risk that differences between two sets of writings will be overlooked in cases 
of particular difficulty or ambiguity.46 
3. Overlooking Differences in Writing Features Due to 
Observer Effects from the Evidence Itself (“Familiarity 
Heuristic”) 
 Much of the literature in the emerging field of cognitive forensics has 
focused on observer effects resulting from extraneous (domain-irrelevant) 
contextual information, neglecting the effect the evidence itself can have on 
the observer’s visual perceptions of that evidence. Although cognitive 
psychologists have long been aware that familiarity can cause oversight of 
unusual events or situations, this heuristic (which I have labeled the 
“familiarity heuristic”) has been largely overlooked as a factor contributing 
to observer effects in forensic handwriting examinations and comparisons.47 
 Julius Fischhof, a pioneer in the field of questioned documents and 
Eastern Europe’s leading handwriting expert in the early twentieth century,48 
recognized that in the context of text-based handwriting, the familiarity of 
letters or words can unconsciously contribute to an examiner’s failure to 
observe or recognize salient writing features, most notably differences 
between two sets of text-based signatures or handwritten items that appear 
to be very similar. Fischhof discovered that by comparing such questioned 
and known signatures or handwriting upside down, the examiner is not 
subconsciously influenced by reading individual letters or words and has a 
more objective view of writing features.49  In essence, the Fischhof Method 
 
 46  The FBI Laboratory recently revised its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 
training materials for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions.  “The training materials provide 
techniques for avoiding bias, such as tracing the entire unknown print before looking at the 
known, reconstructing the deposition pressure to ‘reverse engineer’ distortions, or turning the 
print upside down or looking at it obliquely to get a different perspective.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT 
MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 28 (June 2011), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s1105.pdf (emphasis added).   
 47  D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in 
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2002) (“The flexibility of the human cognitive system permits us to ‘tune’ ourselves to 
perceive some things and ignore other things, usually so automatically and seamlessly that we 
rarely realize we are doing it. This tuning process results in ‘selective attention’ to 
information.”).  
 48  See Thomas Jr., supra note 2.  
 49  JULIUS FISCHHOF, NEW METHOD OF COMPARING HANDWRITING (1927); HANNA F. 
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of upside-down comparison offers the examiner a means of avoiding 
undesirable observer effects from the very thing being observed—the 
handwriting—by preventing the ocular distraction resulting from following 
written characters or words readily familiar to the observer.  It serves to 
minimize the cognitive noise and interference resulting from the familiarity 
heuristic associated with observations of text-based handwriting by altering 
the handwritten image into something that is unrecognizable, thereby 
tricking the brain into thinking it is seeing an unfamiliar image.  By providing 
a totally different visual perspective of the very same evidence, the Fischhof 
Method affords FDEs the type of visual feedback that helps them avoid 
overlooking differences in relevant writing features that might impact the 
accuracy of their judgments about handwriting. It is akin to the professional 
proofreader’s strategy of reading material backward when checking for 
misspellings in order to avoid becoming distracted by content issues. 
 In In re Last, a 1989 New York State Surrogate Court decision involving 
conflicting expert testimony about the validity of a signature appearing on a 
shareholders agreement between two brothers,50 the Court commented 
favorably on the Fischhof Method: 
 
The petitioner’s expert, a well-known authority and author in the 
field of handwriting analysis, concluded that the signature of 
Walter Last on the shareholder’s agreement was a forgery.  Her 
testimony included a detailed analysis of the subject signature 
with a comparison to known exemplars of the decedent’s 
signature.  She employed an “upside-down” technique in which a 
known and a questioned signature are compared after they are 
inverted.  Since there is a natural tendency to read words instead 
of noting variations in characters, this method allegedly gives the 
examiner a truer basis for comparison.  Employing photographic 
enlargements of known signatures and the questioned signature, 
and acknowledging that no two signatures of the same person are 
exactly alike, she emphasized differences in both primary and 
secondary characteristics and opined that the questioned signature 
was not that of the decedent. 
 
There was an attempt to show, both by testimony that the Last 
brothers signed each other’s signature, and by noting certain 
characteristics in Bert’s signature, that the questioned signature 
“is more identical to the characteristics in Bert Last’s 
handwriting . . . than with Walter Last’s signature.”  The court, 
after being advised that the petitioner did not intend to show that 
 
SULNER, DISPUTED DOCUMENTS: NEW METHODS FOR EXAMINING QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 48 
(1966).   
 50  In re Last, No. 1983-1177, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 933 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 9, 1989).  
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Bert had committed the forgery, ruled the testimony irrelevant and 
barred further questioning along these lines. 
 
The respondent countered with another expert, a trained examiner 
of questioned documents.  He described his method of examining 
the questioned signature and comparing it with a series of known 
signatures of the decedent.  The expert considered such features 
as skill, slant, speed, spacing proportions, relative size, and upper 
case letter versus lower-case comparisons.  Pen stops, hesitations, 
tremors and possible tracing were also taken into account.  
Pictorial aspects and design forms were reviewed, particularly as 
they applied to variation (no two signatures of a person are exactly 
alike). On the basis of these tests, this expert concluded that the 
questioned signature is that of the decedent.  When asked why the 
questioned signature appeared to have a break between two letters, 
he said the lack of a “connecting stroke” was insignificant, 
attributing it to a normal variation.  Under extensive cross-
examination, he explained apparent inconsistencies in the 
signatures, such as hooks, straight lines and spaces.  He found all 
fell within the parameters of variation contemplated in multiple, 
one-author signatures. 
 
The expert testimony offered by the petitioner, while lacking in 
certain respects, was more convincing than that presented by the 
respondent.  The analysis conducted by the petitioner’s expert, 
particularly the “upside-down” comparison, was credible and 
persuasive.  The explanation offered by the respondent’s expert 
was insufficient to eliminate glaring differences between the 
signatures, particularly as regards spacing.  The normal variation 
present in everyone’s signature does not account for the 
divergence in primary characteristics, as cogently explained by 
the petitioner’s expert.51 
 
4. Selective Stopping (“Rush to Judgment” Mindset) 
 
      Selective stopping occurs when an investigation prematurely terminates 
further inquiries after having found some evidence to support a favored 
outcome, but before adequate consideration was given to alternative 
hypotheses or the existence and availability of evidence tending to refute the 
favored outcome.  This “rush to judgment” mindset, a byproduct of 
confirmation bias, has contributed to flawed FBI investigations in several 
 
 51  Id. at *5–7 (emphasis added).   
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high-profile cases, such as the wrongful arrests and subsequent exonerations 
of Richard Jewell in connection with the 1996 bombing of Atlanta’s 
Centennial Olympic Park that killed 1 individual and injured 117 others,52 
and Brandon Mayfield in connection with the 2004 Madrid train bombings 
that killed 191 individuals and wounded 1,800.53 
5. Selective Reevaluation of Evidence and/or Revision of 
Findings 
 More often than not, domain-irrelevant background information about a 
given case is conveyed to an examiner at the time the evidence is initially 
submitted for analysis.  Sometimes, the information is obtained afterward, as 
when the examiner learns that his/her findings are inconsistent with test 
results obtained from forensic analysis of other items of evidence in the case, 
or from analysis of the very same evidence by a different analyst. Cross-
communication of findings from analysis of the same or other evidence can 
unduly influence objectivity of handwriting experts, and it has been raised 
as a possible source of error in many cases involving handwriting 
identifications, especially where the disclosure of such information has 
prompted the examiner to refine or change the initial conclusion after 
“reevaluating” the very same evidence.  In response to the 2009 NAS Report 
and revelations that cognitive bias contributed to laboratory and practitioner 
errors in some high-profile criminal cases,54 the FBI laboratory has 
reportedly discontinued its long-standing practice of allowing forensic 
examiners in one discipline unit to know the findings of forensic examiners 
in another discipline unit and to confer with one another in the event of 
conflicting results. 
C. Recommendations (Proposed Solutions) for Minimizing Examiner 
Bias in Forensic Handwriting Investigations 
 Forensic document examiners and others in the forensic science 
community have historically dismissed cognitive bias as a factor 
contributing to examiner errors in casework, insisting that such errors are 
caused by incompetence or dishonesty rather than domain-irrelevant 
 
 52  See Luke Cyphers, Richard Jewell Keeps Being Remembered as a Suspect, Not the 
Hero of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics Bombing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016),   
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/seeking-bomb-shelter-article-1.891938. 
 53  See A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S PROGRESS, supra note 46.  See also Robert B. Stacey, 
Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 
FBI LAB. SERVS. (Jan. 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/jan2005/special_report/2005_special_report.htm; Steven T. Wax & 
Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, CHAMPION MAG. 
(Sept./Oct. 2004).  The facts of the case and Mayfield’s legal claims against the government 
are fully reported in Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).   
 54  2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 122–24. 
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contextual or motivational influences. Consequently, there has been a long-
standing reluctance on the part of the forensic community at large to 
acknowledge the need to develop internal procedures and strategies designed 
to minimize the likelihood of having the objectivity of forensic decision-
making compromised by potentially biasing influences. However, there now 
exists a substantial body of empirical research reported in peer-reviewed 
scientific and legal journals and to the forensic science community at large 
that clearly establishes the susceptibility of handwriting, fingerprint, and 
other pattern recognition experts to having the results of their examinations 
and comparisons cognitively contaminated and unduly influenced by 
domain-irrelevant contextual information and motivational bias.55  With 
more and more stakeholders recognizing and understanding the insidious 
manner in which cognitive contaminants can be toxic to one’s neutrality, 
proposals and recommendations for minimizing examiner bias are now 
receiving considerably more attention within the forensic science, legal, and 
academic communities, as reflected in some of the more recent peer-
 
 55  See, e.g., Keith Inman & Norah Rudin, Sequential Unmasking: Minimizing Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 542–48 (Jay A. Siegel 
& Pekka J. Saukko eds., 2d ed. 2013); SIMON, supra note 39; Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive 
Bias, supra note 36; David Canter et al., Cognitive Bias in Line-up Identifications: The Impact 
of Administrative Knowledge, 53 SCI. & JUST. 83 (2013); Simon A. Cole, Implementing 
Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J. APPLIED RES. 
MEMORY & COGNITION 61 (2013); Itiel E. Dror, Cognitive Forensics and Experimental 
Research about Bias in Forensic Casework, 52 SCI. & JUST. 128 (2012); Itiel E. Dror et al., 
New Application of Psychology to Law: Improving Forensic Evidence and Expert Witness 
Contributions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 78 (2013); Itiel E. Dror, Practical 
Solutions to Cognitive and Human Factor Challenges in Forensic Science, 4 FORENSIC SCI. 
POL’Y & MGMT 105 (2013); Bryan Found & John Ganas, The Management of Domain 
Irrelevant Context Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & 
JUST. 154 (2013); Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
431, 433–34 (2012); Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, 
Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42 (2013); 
Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in 
Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006 (2008); Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. 
Kassin, Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting Evidence? An Empirical Test of 
the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2013); Risinger, Saks, Thompson 
& Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1; Reinoud D. Stoel, Itiel E. Dror, & Larry S. Miller, Bias 
Among Forensic Document Examiners: Still a Need for Procedural Changes, 46 AUSTRALIAN 
J. FORENSIC SCIS. 91 (2014); D. Michael Risinger, How to Undermine Proffered Expert 
Opinion Infected with the Precursors of Bias, Speech at the 66th Annual Meeting of the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014); Andrew Sulner, Chair, Bias in 
Forensics Workshop, & Barry Scheck, Co-Chair, Bias in Forensics Workshop, Examining the 
Sources and Impacts of Bias on Perceptual and Cognitive Judgments Made by Forensic 
Experts, Strategies for Excluding or Impeaching Expert Testimony Tainted by Bias, and 
Proposed Solutions for Minimizing or Inhibiting Biasing Influences, Speeches at the 66th 
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014); Andrew 
Sulner, Examining Sources of Bias and Illustrating Their Impact on Handwriting Opinions 
and Testimony of Forensic Document Examiners, Speech at the 66th Annual Meeting of the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014).   
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reviewed publications and presentations addressing this topic.56  
Unfortunately, the FDE community has been slow in incorporating bias 
control measures into existing standards governing best practices for 
performing handwriting examinations. 
 In the case of forensic handwriting investigations, virtually all 
procedures and strategies that can be used to minimize examiner bias involve 
either implementing examiner debiasing techniques or restructuring 
institutional context management and evidence testing protocols, as briefly 
summarized below. 
1. Considering the “Oppositional Hypothesis” First 
 As domain-irrelevant information invariably enters the scene through the 
mouths of lawyers or clients intent on convincing the handwriting expert of 
the merits of their claim(s), healthy skepticism on the part of the expert goes 
a long way toward ensuring neutrality in the analysis and evaluation of 
handwriting evidence.  In considering the oppositional hypothesis first, an 
examiner approaches the investigation with the mindset of having been hired 
by the adverse or oppositional party.  In this way, the examiner is forced to 
consider the least favored hypothesis first and elaborate on the reasons for 
 
 56  Id.  See also e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Bias Control: The National Commission on 
Forensic Science, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Draft 
Guidance on Cognitive Bias Effects from the Forensic Science Regulator for England and 
Wales, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
(AAFS) (Feb. 17, 2015); Andrew Sulner et al., Human Factors in Forensic Science: Why 
Cognitive Bias Can Lead to Flawed Expert Opinions and Testimony, How Its Influence Can 
Be Minimized, and What Challenges Testifying Experts and Judges Can Expect to Face at 
the Plenary Session, Speeches at the 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 18, 2015).  All 
speaker presentations are viewable on YouTube.  See Dan Simon, Cognitive and Motivational 
Causes of Investigative Error, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=46mS8gvAYMU&feature=youtu.be; William C. Thompson, Are Good Intentions and 
Willpower Sufficient to Overcome Contextual Bias? A Look at the Psychological Literature, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bzXft_13Ass&feature=y
outu.be; Saul Kassin, Confessions in Context: Why Confessions Corrupt Forensic Perceptions 
and Judgments, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
hC7EBZCnWNs&feature=youtu.be; Andrew Sulner, Why Forensic Scientists Should 
Embrace the Concept of Bias Control: A Practitioner’s Perspective, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzH2tNVdqfw&feature=youtu.be; Barry 
Scheck, Beginning A Dialogue: Human Factors and Forensic Pathology, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cjbkVUlDOs&feature=youtu.be; Andrew 
Baker, History, Cognitive Bias, Incompetence, and Corruption Are Not the Same Thing,  
YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiePh1COEYE&featu
re=youtu.be; Andrew Sulner, Bias Effects in Forensic Handwriting Investigations and Expert 
Testimony: An Insider’s View, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 17, 
2015); Andrew Sulner, Chair, Bias in Forensics Workshop, & Barry Scheck, Co-Chair, Bias 
in Forensics Workshop, Cognitive Bias Issues in the Forensic Analysis of Pattern and 
Impression Evidence and in Medicolegal Evaluations, Speeches at the 67th Annual Meeting 
of the AAFS (Feb. 17, 2015). 
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rejecting it.  Only then does the examiner consider the most favored 
hypothesis. 
2. Considering Alternative Possibilities and Hypotheses 
(Playing the Role of “Devil’s Advocate”) 
 Considering all plausible alternative possibilities before deciding on a 
particular one is essential to the integrity of any type of investigation. 
Promoting a “devil’s advocate” mindset in which thinking “outside the box” 
is encouraged should therefore be prioritized in the training and continuing 
education of all forensic experts, as contrarian and critical thinking skills are 
needed in order to be able to both generate and properly evaluate plausible 
alternative hypotheses. This is particularly important in the case of 
handwriting, as its physical appearance can be significantly affected by a 
variety of environmental and motivational factors (for example, awkward 
writing position, the influence of drug or alcohol intoxication/withdrawal, 
the import of the document itself, and deliberate attempt at disguise). 
 It has also been suggested that examiners should not be allowed to 
summarily dismiss alternative possibilities and hypotheses, and that any 
refutations should be accompanied by documentation describing in detail the 
reasons for rejecting each alternative possibility. 
3. Using the Fischhof Method to Compare Text-Based 
Writings That Appear Very Similar and as a “Self-Review” 
of One’s Initial Observations 
 The Fischhof Method of upside-down comparison described earlier in 
this Article can be used as a possible safeguard against overlooking 
differences in salient writing features whenever a handwriting expert is 
confronted with two sets of text-based writings that appear quite similar. This 
method of comparison can also afford an examiner a “fresh new look” at the 
evidence, enabling observations from the initial analysis to be measured 
against observations derived from inverted image comparisons of the very 
same evidence. Optimally, such a self-conducted review should take place at 
a time well after the initial handwriting analysis so as to reduce the likelihood 
of any “interference” produced by recall of observations made during the 
initial analysis. 
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4. Using Institutional Debiasing Techniques: Context 
Management Protocols and Procedures 
i. Separating the Crime Laboratory or Evidence Analysis 
Function from the Police and Prosecutorial Functions 
        The 2009 NAS Report recommended separating the crime laboratory 
function from any law enforcement department or agency, theorizing that a 
truly autonomous crime laboratory would mitigate, if not remove, the 
institutional pressures placed on crime laboratory analysts to produce results 
that favor the police or prosecution’s theory of the case, and would foster a 
more neutral mindset that prioritizes the truth-seeking goal.57  To date, little 
headway has been made in implementing this concept due to practical and 
economic considerations, as well as institutional resistance to change. 
ii. Using Sequential Unmasking Procedures and Case 
Managers 
   Context management protocols involve shielding the examiner from 
domain-irrelevant information and employing “sequential unmasking” 
procedures to control the order in which domain-relevant but potentially 
biasing information is “unmasked” and disclosed to the examiner.  Ideally, 
the examiner is kept as blind as possible for as long as possible, and remains 
unaware of domain irrelevant information until all examinations and tests are 
completed. 
   Optimally, a case manager who is privy to all the facts of the case is 
responsible for determining which evidence to test, and for evaluating and 
interpreting the test results in the context of the case in order to assess 
whether the test results support an inculpatory or exculpatory hypothesis.  
The case manager should also possess, or have access to, relevant subject 
matter expertise, as difficult decisions may need to be made about what 
information is domain-relevant and when and how such information should 
be obtained and disclosed to the examiner. 
   The strict protocol for sequential unmasking requires that after looking 
at the questioned item(s) and before looking at any exemplar(s), the examiner 
must determine (and make a written record of) the specific distinguishing 
features that the examiner would rely on in deciding whether to associate or 
disassociate the questioned item(s) with the exemplar(s).58  This procedural 
 
 57  See 2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 23–24 (“Recommendation 4: To improve the 
scientific bases of forensic science examinations and to maximize independence from or 
autonomy within the law enforcement community, Congress should authorize and appropriate 
incentive funds to the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) for allocation to state and 
local jurisdictions for the purpose of removing all public forensic laboratories and facilities 
from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ offices.”) 
 58  See Inman & Rudin, supra note 55, at 544–45; Krane, supra note 55, at 1006; Risinger, 
Saks, Thompson & Rosenthal, supra note 1; William C. Thompson, Painting the Target 
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requirement is deemed a necessary safeguard against target-shifting, in 
which knowledge about features contained in the exemplar(s) influences the 
examiner’s interpretation of the questioned item(s) and the examiner’s 
decision about which features are relevant and irrelevant for comparison 
purposes.59 
   Although sequential unmasking procedures can be implemented with 
relative ease, most, if not all, forensic laboratories in the United States have 
not done so for handwriting investigations.  This may be due to the fact that 
the method by which a handwriting expert selects the salient writing features 
to be used for comparison purposes is subjective and examiner-dependent, 
there being no standardized best-practice protocol for how such feature 
selection should be made, let alone documented.  The Document 
Examination Unit of the Victoria Police Forensic Services Department in 
Australia, however, most recently embarked on a pilot study using a 
modified version of the sequential unmasking protocol for handwriting 
cases.60 
iii. Using Exemplar (Evidence) Lineups and Blind Evidence 
Submission Protocols 
   In investigations seeking to determine whether a handwritten item can 
be attributed to a particular source writer, the FDE is often presented with 
the questioned item(s) and only the suspected (targeted) writer’s reference 
item(s), such as handwriting exemplars.  Some commentators from the legal 
and scientific communities have criticized the suggestiveness inherent in 
such a procedure, arguing that exemplar lineups should be used for 
handwriting identifications and other types of evidential source attributions 
in much the same way that photo lineups are used for eyewitness 
identifications.61  As the same deficiencies that make a photo lineup unduly 
suggestive make an exemplar lineup unduly suggestive, both types of lineups 
require presenting similar-looking “fillers” (“foils”) to the observer (the 
handwriting expert or the eyewitness).  Thus, in blind exemplar lineups, the 
examiner would receive the handwritten item(s) in question along with an 
array of similar-looking handwriting exemplars from a group of anonymous 
 
Around the Matching Profile: The Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy in Forensic DNA 
Interpretation, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 257, 274. 
 59  See, e.g., Inman & Rudin, supra note 55, at 542–48; Krane, supra note 55, at 1006; D. 
Michael Risinger, The Need for Sequential Unmasking—With Some Thoughts on How to 
Undermine Proffered Expert Testimony Infected with the Precursors of Bias, Speech at the 
66th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 17, 2014).  
 60  See Found, supra note 55, at 154–58, for a detailed description of the Australian 
protocol and how their sequential unmasking procedures were modified so that only the 
essential information required for performing the requisite handwriting examinations and 
comparisons is available to the examiner.   
 61  Id.   
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individuals, including the suspected writer, and the examiner would receive 
no information or cognitive cues that might unduly influence the examiner 
to reach a particular outcome.  To ensure that the analyst receives no 
improper cues from the person(s) tasked with submitting the evidence to be 
analyzed, it has been suggested that exemplar lineups be double-blind, 
meaning that both the analyst and the individual(s) submitting the evidence 
or arranging the exemplar lineup(s) not know the identity of the suspect or 
the preferred outcome.62 
   In theory, every forensic pattern recognition discipline that requires 
comparisons between unknown (questioned) items and known reference 
items (exemplars) in order to determine the source of the unknown item(s) 
can benefit from the use of exemplar lineups, as the presence of a large 
number of “fillers” resembling the questioned item would arguably enhance 
the reliability of any ensuing identification or source attribution. In practice, 
however, obtaining handwriting “fillers” sufficiently similar to the 
questioned writing is far more difficult than obtaining suitable “fillers” for 
photo lineups, and such exemplar lineups may be of little usefulness in 
instances where the questioned writing displays several highly distinctive, 
individualizing writing features. In addition, double-blind lineups would 
seem to be far more feasible in handwriting investigations undertaken by 
public sector or institutional forensic laboratories where examiners can work 
with case managers possessing discipline-specific (handwriting) expertise 
and “blind” evidence lineup administrators than by private sector examiners 
who work as solo practitioners and receive their casework assignments 
directly from lawyers or clients, oftentimes accompanied by cues that 
indicate the desired outcome. 
   The use of single-blind exemplar lineups in handwriting cases is not a 
new development.  For example, in investigating the source of anonymous 
handwritten letters emanating from a limited population of possible writers, 
experienced forensic document examiners routinely insist on using exemplar 
lineups and being kept blinded to which of the exemplars belongs to the 
suspected writer until such time as the examiner has completed all 
examinations and reached a decision.63  However, the usefulness of such 
 
 62  See Canter, supra note 55, at 83–88.   
 63  The failure to use exemplar lineups may also have contributed to the erroneous 
handwriting opinions offered in nineteenth-century France’s infamous Dreyfus Affair.  
Nearly a century later, France is once again confronted with the exemplar lineup issue in a 
murder case known as the “Gregory Affair.”  The case involves the October 1984 kidnapping 
of four-year-old Gregory Villemin and a series of anonymous handwritten poison-pen letters 
that were sent to his family.  After the boy’s body was discovered, a witness incriminated an 
uncle, who was indicted after a handwriting expert identified him as the author of the 
anonymous notes.  The witness later recanted, but not before Gregory’s father killed the uncle 
to avenge his son’s murder.  In a subsequent blind exemplar lineup procedure in which 
handwriting exemplars from all members of the family were examined and compared to the 
anonymous notes by a second expert, Gregory’s mother, Christine, was identified as the 
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
670 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631 
lineups varies inversely with the distinctiveness of the handwriting features 
observed in the questioned writing(s); that is, the more distinctive the writing 
features in the questioned item, the more difficult it will be to find similar-
looking “fillers,” and hence, the less useful the “fillers” will be. 
 Single-blind exemplar lineups prevent the handwriting expert from 
knowing the favored outcome because even if the expert has been exposed 
to other domain-irrelevant information, the expert would still not know 
which of the exemplars came from the suspected writer.  Throughout my 
career, I have always preferred and made every reasonable effort to use 
single-blind exemplars in source attribution investigations, and I have 
publicly advocated for the routine use of single-blind exemplars in all source 
attribution handwriting investigations.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
author, and she was indicted.  Christine served almost eight years in prison for Gregory’s 
murder before being cleared on appeal.  See Richard Bernstein, All of France is Asking: Who 
Killed Petit Gregory?, N.Y. TIMES, (July 16, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/16/
world/all-of-france-is-asking-who-killed-petit-gregory.html; see also INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
July 18, 1985, at 2, col. 3.  In 2008, an appellate court ordered the case to be reopened in the 
hope that new advances in forensic science could shed light on DNA evidence.  France still 
awaits the final chapter of this unsolved murder mystery that has seen two defendants indicted 
for the same murder on the basis of being identified by two different handwriting experts as 
the sole author of the anonymous notes.   
 64  Andrew Sulner, Why Forensic Scientists Should Embrace the Concept of Bias 
Control: A Practitioner’s Perspective, Speech at 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 18, 
2015) (video of speech viewable at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzH2tNVdqfw&feat
ure=youtu.be); see also Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive Bias, supra note 36.   
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V. CASEWORK PEER REVIEWS: THE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THEY 
ARE AND AREN’T AND WHY DIRECT TESTIMONY ABOUT ANY 
REVIEW PERFORMED BY A NON-TESTIFYING EXPERT IS 
INADMISSIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A. Types of Casework Peer Reviews 
 There are three types of casework peer reviews that can be performed: 
(1) administrative reviews, (2) technical reviews, and (3) verifications.65 
1. Administrative Review 
  An administrative review involves a procedure used to check case file 
documentation and case reports for consistency with laboratory policy and 
for editorial correctness.66  Essentially, it checks that the final report is 
coherent, reflects the examinations performed, and is free of spelling and 
grammar errors. It is acceptable for administrative reviews to be undertaken 
by someone without expertise in the relevant subject matter, i.e., forensic 
document examination. 
2. Technical Review 
  A technical review involves a review of notes, data and other 
supporting documents that form the basis for a scientific conclusion to ensure 
that proper protocols and standards have been followed and that the case 
(bench) notes and any diagrams support the conclusion reported.67  This type 
of review does not involve a full reexamination of the actual evidence; it 
simply checks that the correct and appropriate procedures have been 
followed and documented by the examiner, that the conclusions reached by 
the examiner are supported by the observations/results documented in the 
case file, and that any limitations with respect to the findings have been 
recorded and included in the report.  Technical reviews must therefore be 
carried out by someone who is qualified in the relevant discipline, i.e., 
another FDE.68 
 
 65  Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice Through a Systems Approach, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 184 (Feb. 2012), 
http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745 [hereinafter 2012 NIST 
LATENT PRINT REPORT].  See also AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. & LAB. ACCREDITATION 
BD., ASCLD/LAB-INTERNATIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ACCREDITATION 
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE TESTING LABORATORIES (2011), http://des.wa.gov/sites/default/files/
public/documents/About/1063/RFP/Add7_Item4ASCLD.pdf; Scientific Working Grp. on 
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study & Tech., Quality Assurance Guidelines for Latent Print 
Examiners: Version 4.0, (Sept. 2006), http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/quality-
assurance/100210_Quality-Assurance_4.0.pdf. 
 66  2012 NIST LATENT PRINT REPORT, supra note 65, at 184.   
 67  Id.   
 68  Id.  However, laboratory accreditation standards may not require that the individual 
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  A blind technical review is one in which the reviewer has no knowledge 
of the examiner’s conclusion prior to forming his own opinion, which is 
based solely on the case file documentation;69 however, the reviewer may or 
may not have been blinded to domain-irrelevant case information. 
3. Verification 
  This is a review procedure in which a second examiner independently 
examines all the evidence examined by the first examiner and reaches his or 
her own conclusion.  A blind verification is a full-fledged reexamination of 
the same evidence by another expert who is blinded from domain-irrelevant 
context information and is unaware of the original examiner’s conclusion.70  
A double-blind71 verification refers to a verification in which the reviewer 
does not know the identity of the initial examiner and vice versa.72  
Government forensic handwriting laboratories frequently perform 
administrative and technical reviews as part of one review process, using a 
checklist or worksheet that identifies the elements of the review process.  An 
example of an actual worksheet (redacted) used by a state crime laboratory 
appears on the next page: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conducting the technical review be an active forensic document examiner or currently be 
proficiency tested.  See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. & LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., 
supra note 65.   
 69  2012 NIST LATENT PRINT REPORT, supra note 65, at 105.   
 70  See Canter, supra note 55, at 87; Inman, supra note 55, at 542.   
 71  “[A]n experimental procedure in which neither the subjects nor the experimenters 
know the make-up of the tests and control groups.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 74a (1993).   
 72  Id. 
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B. To Verify or Not to Verify?—Should the “V” in “ACE-V” Be a 
Prerequisite to the Admissibility of Handwriting Identification 
Opinion Evidence? 
“ACE-V” is the acronym used to describe a four-step process used in the 
forensic analysis of handwriting and other types of pattern evidence, most 
notably fingerprints; it stands for Analyze, Compare, Evaluate, and Verify.73 
“‘[M]any sources have described the verification phase of the ACE-V 
process to be a repeat of the ACE process done by another examiner,’ while 
‘[o]ther sources describe verification as a confirmation of the original 
examiner’s conclusion.’”74  Essentially, the “V” in “ACE-V” is the 
verification type of casework peer review defined above—a full and 
complete reexamination of the evidence by a second examiner that results in 
an independent verification of the first examiner’s reported findings and 
opinion. 
Although the independent verification step of the ACE-V methodology 
is not a formal requirement for handwriting analysis, there are differing 
views as to whether it should be a prerequisite to the admissibility of 
handwriting identification opinion evidence.  As both a practitioner of the 
discipline and a lawyer, my views on this subject necessarily consider both 
the practical and legal implications of mandating verification. 
Most recently, this issue came to the forefront in two federal court cases, 
Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting75 and Crew Tile Distrib., Inc. 
v. Porcelanosa Los Angeles, Inc.76  Both cases involved the same putative 
handwriting expert, Wendy Carlson, and the same task, evaluating the 
authenticity of a contested signature.77  In both cases, motions were filed to 
 
 73  See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 2009).   
 74  Crew Tile Distribution, Inc. v. Porcelanosa L.A., Inc., No. 13-cv-3206, 2016 WL 
8608447, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2016) (quoting Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney, The 
Etiology of ACE-V and Its Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V 
and the Scientific Method of Hypothesis Testing, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345 (2006)).   
 75  Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016). 
 76  Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447. 
 77  Ms. Carlson is not board certified by either the ABFDE or the BFDE, but her 
Curriculum Vitae included in an August 16, 2016 Expert Report she submitted in a New 
Jersey case (on file with the author) lists her as a “Certified Forensic Document Examiner and 
Registered Investigator,” and claims that “[i]n the last seven years, [she] has examined more 
than 10,000 documents and rendered opinions in approximately 1,000 active cases and 
multiple peer reviews involving questioned signatures, altered documents, handwritings, legal 
contracts, court documents, anonymous writing, and graffiti.”  As noted in Almeciga and Crew 
Tile, her apprenticeship training took the form of a two-year part-time internet course which 
involved about five to ten hours of work per week under the tutelage of a mentor she met with 
personally when they were “able to connect.”  The course was offered through the 
International School of Forensic Document Examination, an unaccredited school run by Bart 
Baggett, possibly with involvement by his father, Curtis Leo Baggett, that offers a 
“certification” upon completion of the course.  Carlson’s CV also claims she obtained 
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exclude Ms. Carlson’s testimony and opinions in their entirety, alleging, 
inter alia, that Carlson’s failure to perform the verification step of ACE-V 
rendered her methodology critically flawed and her opinion consequently 
unreliable and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
In Almeciga, U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern 
District of New York excluded Carlson’s testimony, finding her 
“methodology [was] fundamentally unreliable and critically flawed,” in part, 
because she failed to perform the verification step of the ACE-V process that 
she claimed to have followed.  Judge Rakoff stated, 
 
while Carlson purported to apply the ACE-V method in her expert 
report, . . . she admitted at the Daubert hearing that she did not 
have time to obtain a verification of her opinion in this case and 
that her report was inaccurate in this respect.  Virtually by 
definition, then, Carlson failed to “reliably appl[y] the principles 
and methods” in question “to the facts of this case.”78 
 
Judge Rakoff did not elaborate on why or whether he considers the lack 
of verification, in and of itself, to be such a critical flaw that it, alone, can be 
the death knell to admissibility, although some may take his decision to 
imply just that.  Given the case-specific facts of Almeciga, and the counter-
intuitiveness of assigning such critical importance to independent 
verification of an expert’s opinion, I am inclined to believe that the lack of 
verification mentioned by Judge Rakoff was meant to highlight one of 
several striking contradictions between Carlson’s reports and her in-court 
testimony, rather than to declare verification a sine qua non to a reliable 
handwriting identification opinion. 
In Crew Tile Distribution, decided four months after Almeciga, U.S. 
District Court Judge William J. Martínez of the District of Colorado denied 
Plaintiff’s Federal Rule of Evidence 702 motion to exclude Carlson’s 
testimony.79  In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that Carlson’s failure to 
complete the verification step of ACE-V renders her opinions unreliable and 
inadmissible, Judge Martinez concluded that although the lack of 
verification is concerning, it does not render Carlson’s testimony 
 
“certifications” from the American College of Forensic Examiners for completion of their 
Registered Investigator course, Crime Scene Investigation course, and Digital Forensics 
Introduction course.  For information on the American College of Forensic Examiners and 
the demise of its founder, see Radley Balko, The Emperor of Junk Science Forensics Has 
Died, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2017/08/31/the-emperor-of-junk-science-forensics-has-died/?utm_term=.402e4d5
c0e69. 
 78   Judge Rakoff did, however, note that “[i]n her Supplemental Expert Report, Carlson 
entirely drops the ‘verification’ step from her methodology, and purports to apply the ‘ACE’ 
methodology.” Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426 n.14 (citations omitted).   
 79  Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447, at *13. 
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inadmissible.  The following excerpts reflect a well-reasoned judicial 
perspective with respect to the importance of verification in evaluating the 
reliability of handwriting identification opinions: 
 
Plaintiff contends that Ms. Carlson’s failure to complete the 
verification step renders her opinions unreliable and inadmissible. 
Plaintiff relies on United States v. McDaniels.  There, the court 
concluded that the proponent of the evidence had not provided 
“clear evidence that [the expert] actually complied with steps 2–4 
of this [ACE–V] methodology in the preparation of her expert 
report and testimony,” and therefore struck the testimony for lack 
of a sufficient showing of reliability.  McDaniels is not on all fours 
with the facts here, where Ms. Carlson completed the “ACE” 
steps, but not verification. 
 
In performing the Court’s gatekeeping function, “testing” and 
“peer review” are only two of the illustrative factors articulated in 
Daubert, and “independent testing is not the sine qua non of 
admissibility under Daubert.”  Moreover, “some of the Daubert 
factors may be less helpful when the evidence under consideration 
is not scientific in the strict sense.”  The gatekeeping function 
should be flexible, and “the relevant reliability concerns may focus 
upon personal knowledge or experience.”  Further, the Tenth 
Circuit, has criticized the verification step of ACE-V analysis as 
“not truly independent,” suggesting that such verification adds 
little to reliability, but nevertheless finding expert testimony based 
on ACE-V protocols admissible.   
 
Given these considerations, while the lack of verification is 
concerning, the Court concludes that it bears on the weight and 
credibility of Ms. Carlson’s testimony.  It does not render the 
testimony inadmissible.  The Court’s role as gatekeeper is not to 
determine whether the opinion is correct, only that the method was 
reliable enough to be presented to the jury.  As described in the 
materials submitted by Plaintiff, the role of verification in this 
context is primarily to make the expert’s work “reviewable,” even 
if it was not actually reviewed.  Plaintiff does not argue that Ms. 
Carlson’s work is not “reviewable,” nor that an expert of Plaintiff’s 
choosing could not have reviewed and critiqued the analysis based 
on the work shown in her report and supporting materials.  
 
Moreover, as a practical matter, making the verification step of 
ACE-V a prerequisite in every case would essentially require 
parties to obtain two experts’ opinions before the first became 
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admissible.  And while verification might cause an examiner to 
revisit her approach, it does not directly alter the examination and 
review completed under the first three steps of ACE-V.  The Court 
is therefore not persuaded that obtaining verification was a 
prerequisite to admissibility in this case.  The Court therefore 
agrees with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Crisp, that to the 
extent Ms. Carlson’s analysis is “flawed or flimsy,” including for 
lack of verification, “an able . . . lawyer will bring that fact to the 
jury’s attention,” and the jury will be “left to examine the 
[Agreement] and decide for itself whether it agree[s] with the 
expert.”80 
 
The different perspectives of Judges Rakoff and Martinez probably have 
more to do with the specific facts that came to light in the respective Daubert 
hearings, rather than a fundamental difference of opinion as to how Rule 702 
should be applied.  However, this is an issue that requires an in-depth 
analysis of the respective facts of each case, something that is beyond the 
scope of this Article.81  In any event, I believe this issue is somewhat of a 
“red herring” and moot because it is now settled law that verification of a 
testifying expert’s opinion by a non-testifying expert may not be brought up 
in the direct examination of the testifying expert,82 as discussed below. 
C. Testimony About Peer Review(s) Performed by a Non-Testifying 
Expert Constitutes Improper Bolstering and/or Inadmissible 
Hearsay 
FDEs, as well as expert witnesses from other forensic science 
disciplines, have often testified that their casework is subjected to so-called 
“peer review.”  The proponent of such testimony seeks its admission to 
demonstrate the quality assurance protocol employed in the testifying 
expert’s forensic laboratory prior to the issuance of a final report.83  
However, implicit in any such proffer is the notion that the peer review 
process enhances the reliability of the proffered opinion evidence.  The 
typical line of inquiry posed to the testifying expert might be: 
 
 80  Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447, at *4–5 (citations omitted). 
 81  Nevertheless, in Part VI of this Article, infra, I have provided some limited, case-
specific analysis with respect to a critical issue in that case—the impropriety and unreliability 
of Ms. Carlson’s exclusive reliance on self-serving post litem motem exemplars in concluding 
that the contested signature was a forgery, especially in the face of facts strongly suggesting 
that the disclaiming signatory had provided Ms. Carlson with disguised exemplars.   
 82  However, the testifying expert may not be precluded from mentioning it in response 
to a question posed on cross-examination that asks if his or her work was subjected to any 
kind of “peer” review by another examiner.   
 83   Casework reviews are designed to address quality of output and human factors issues, 
which can result in nonconformity with laboratory procedures and documentation 
requirements, and errors in report writing and testimony.   
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Q:         Was your work peer reviewed by anyone else? 
          
A:         Yes.  Our lab has 100% peer review, both technically and 
administratively, by colleagues within the same section.  Every 
case worked on by one examiner is reviewed by another, and if 
there is any disagreement between the two, a report does not leave 
the lab. 
 
Lawyers and trial judges mistakenly assume that the mere mention of the 
words “peer review” equates to a comprehensive reexamination of the 
evidence and an independent verification of a given opinion or conclusion.  
This is because they are unaware of the different types of reviews and which 
of them is or is not routinely performed.84  Unless one knows what a technical 
or administrative review really entails, the above answer is misleading and 
disingenuous.  The above answer clearly implies that before finalizing any 
report or conclusion, a “second set of eyes” reviewed the very same evidence 
and came to the same conclusion as the testifying expert, which can only 
occur with a verification type of review. 
Trial judges have routinely allowed this type of testimony and appellate 
courts have typically found that any error in doing so was harmless85—until 
recently.86  Some lawyers have attempted to challenge such testimony by 
 
 84  A technical review is sometimes referred to as peer review in government forensic 
laboratory settings.  The term “peer review” is more widely used to describe the process of 
reviewing manuscripts submitted for publication to a scientific journal, which is customarily 
double-blind.  
 85  Bunche v. State, 5 So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See id. (determining error 
was harmless when fingerprint handwriting expert testified that a non-testifying expert 
verified his work); State v. Jones, 368 S.E.2d 844, 846–49 (N.C. 1988) (finding trial court 
properly permitted a fingerprint expert to testify that another expert had checked and 
concurred with the testifying expert’s conclusion, because under the standard procedures 
followed by the expert he could not have arrived at and testified to his opinion without the 
verification by the other expert); State v. Williams, No. 95CA93, 1996 WL 753216, at *10 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (permitting fingerprint expert’s testimony that he had his results 
verified by another fingerprint expert). 
 86  See Miller v. State, 127 So. 3d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining error was 
harmful when handwriting expert testified that non-testifying expert also determined 
handwriting belonged to defendant).  See also Potts v. State, 57 So. 3d 292, 294 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (determining error was harmful when fingerprint analyst testified that another 
fingerprint expert determined fingerprints belonged to defendant); Telfort v. State, 978 So. 2d 
225, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error by 
allowing a fingerprint expert to testify that his identification of the defendant’s fingerprint 
was verified by two other examiners); State v. Smith, 628 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994) (finding fingerprint technician’s testimony that her identification was verified by 
another technician was hearsay); State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928, 930–32 (N.H. 2007) (finding 
fingerprint expert’s testimony regarding another expert’s verification inadmissible, because 
the verification did not form a basis for the testifying expert’s opinion, but was simply a 
necessary prerequisite to the release of his already formed opinion); State v. Wicker, 832 P.2d 
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establishing that the casework peer review was biased and unreliable because 
it was not performed blindly, e.g., the reviewer was a “friendly” colleague 
or coworker, working in the very same laboratory unit or office.  In the past, 
I have publicly advocated that lawyers should instead seek to exclude such 
testimony altogether because it constitutes improper bolstering or 
inadmissible hearsay, or both,87 an argument that has found judicial 
acceptance of late.88  Accordingly, lawyers, judges, and testifying experts 
need to know the impact of recent court rulings declaring that testimony 
about case review performed by non-testifying experts is inadmissible on 
evidentiary grounds. 
Before addressing the cases, I must first confess that my previous 
approach (and that of many lawyers and courts) was too narrow in that it 
failed to sufficiently emphasize the distinction between bolstering and 
hearsay.  “Bolstering” refers to the proffer of information for the sole 
purpose of raising the credit the jury might give to a witness’s evidence 
before the witness’s credibility has been attacked in any way on cross 
examination or otherwise.89  The most common example of bolstering 
evidence is evidence of a prior consistent statement to rebut a charge of 
recent fabrication.90  Such evidence is not admissible unless and until there 
is some suggestion by the opponent on cross-examination or otherwise that 
a witness’s testimony on direct is a recent fabrication.91  Then evidence of 
prior consistent statements by the witness that occurred before the suggested 
impetus to falsify are admissible to rehabilitate the witness.  Traditionally, 
there was no hearsay exception for such prior consistent statements, but they 
 
127, 128–30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding fingerprint expert’s testimony that his 
identification was verified by another technician was inadmissible hearsay). 
 87  Andrew Sulner, Impeaching Self-Serving Case Review Evidence and Excluding Case 
Review Testimony by a Second Forensic Document Examiner, Speech at the Annual 
Symposium of the Association of Forensic Document Examiners (Nov. 6, 2009); Andrew 
Sulner, Disingenuous Testimony About Casework Peer Review: Understanding What it 
Really Means and When Such Testimony Will Be Precluded, Speech at the 64th Annual 
Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 21, 2012); Andrew Sulner, 
Legal Update: Recent Court Decisions Declaring Testimony About Case Reviews Performed 
by Non-Testifying Experts to be Inadmissible, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 20, 2015); Andrew Sulner, Peer Reviews of 
Forensic Casework: Understanding the Different Types of Standard Reviews and Why Courts 
Have Ruled that Evidence of Casework Peer Reviews Performed by Non-Testifying Experts 
is Inadmissible, Speech at the Annual Symposium of the Association of Forensic Document 
Examiners (Oct. 29, 2016).   
 88  See supra note 86. 
 89  See generally IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 3, § 702. 
 90  There may be other circumstances where prior consistent statements are considered 
allowable rehabilitation, see FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(b)(ii), but the illustration is confined to 
the rebuttal of recent fabrication as set out by FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(b)(i).  
 91  See IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 3, § 720.  Professor Imwinkelried notes that 
some jurisdictions also allow rehabilitation by prior consistent statement when there is a 
suggestion that the live witness’s memory is faulty on direct examination. 
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were admitted on the assertedly non-hearsay ground that independent of the 
truth of either the statement from the witness stand or the prior statement, the 
correspondence shows that the assertions were not made up as a result of the 
suggested impetus to falsify.92  All purely accrediting information in the form 
of an assertion by anyone, whether the witness or another, is admitted only 
on such a non-hearsay rationale if there is no hearsay exception or exclusion 
covering it.93  When the information only accredits the witness if it is true, 
this is merely corroboration, and the proper objection is not “improper 
bolstering,” but “improper corroboration by hearsay assertions not within 
any exception.”94  It is hard to formulate a credible non-hearsay rationale for 
the admission of opinions by other experts that the testifying expert’s 
procedures were proper, or that the testifying expert’s opinions were 
accurate.  So the proper objection should probably be “improper bolstering 
and improper corroboration by hearsay not within any exception,” 
supplemented in a criminal case by an objection to the violation of the 
Confrontation rights of the defendant95 if the witness is a witness for the 
prosecution. 
In Miller v. State of Florida,96 the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth 
Circuit of Florida overturned a defendant’s conviction for robbery and 
murder based, in part, on the trial court having permitted two government 
handwriting experts to testify that their conclusions were subject to a peer 
review process in which another analyst had corroborated their findings after 
independently examining and analyzing the same evidence. The Florida 
appellate court’s decision was based upon the evidentiary rules prohibiting 
testimony bolstering and the constitutional right of Confrontation guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.97 
The Miller case involved a restaurant supervisor who was found duct 
taped to a folding chair in the closed restaurant and shot in the head.98  The 
only physical evidence linking the disgruntled ex-employee, Jesse Miller, to 
the crime scene was a small amount of handwriting on a note pad that 
 
 92  Id. 
 93  Because instructions trying to make this distinction to the jury are ineffective in regard 
to prior consistent statements of the witness him- or herself, most modern evidence codes 
provide for a hearsay exception for qualifying prior consistent statements (or an exclusion 
from being classified as hearsay, which is functionally the same thing). See FED. R. EVID. 
801(D)(1)(b) (stating a hearsay exclusion); N.J. R. EVID. 803(a) (stating a hearsay exception).  
 94  I thank Edward Imwinkelried for pointing this out to me.   
 95  It is hard to imagine how such assertions might be categorized as “non-testimonial” as 
that phrase is used in Crawford v. Washington and its progeny so as to escape confrontation 
requirements.   
 96  Miller v. State, 127 So. 3d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 97  Id. at 586. 
 98  Id. at 581. 
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contained the following writing: “‘55, 65, 9, 10,’ ‘4 time stop,’ ‘left right left 
right.’”99 
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court had erred in allowing 
two handwriting experts to bolster their testimony by describing the peer 
review process.100  The trial judge had overruled defense counsel’s objection 
on the ground of “bolstering” and allowed the first handwriting expert (FDE 
#1) to give the following testimony: 
 
Q.         Okay. Does your conclusion have to be peer reviewed by 
another analyst within the context of your laboratory? 
 
A.         It does. 
 
Q.         And is that part of your protocols and procedures? 
 
A.         Yes.101 
 
FDE #1 concluded with a “high degree of probability” that the defendant 
executed the text on the yellow notepad, explaining that “high degree of 
probability” meant it was a virtual certainty that the defendant had written 
the text.  The State then asked if his conclusion was contained in the report 
issued by the lab: 
 
Q.        Now, let me ask you this question: Was that the opinion 
within the purview of your laboratory protocols? 
 
A.        The ultimate conclusion that I just gave, the high degree of 
probability, was the conclusion that exited the laboratory due to 
the peer review process that we follow. 
 
Defense Counsel: Objection, bolstering. 
 
Court:  Overruled.102 
 
 
 
 99  Id. at 581.  “A partial print, sufficient for identification, was obtained from the duct 
tape found on the victim. No identification was made despite numerous comparisons, 
including the defendant’s. The latent fingerprints obtained from various surfaces at the crime 
scene matched those of other employees, but not the defendant. The only latent fingerprint on 
the yellow notepad belonged to the restaurant manager.”  Id. at 581–82.   
 100  Id. at 585. 
 101  Id. at 583. 
 102  Miller, 127 So. 3d at 583. 
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FDE #1 then went on to clarify that his initial conclusion was a “positive” 
identification, which was a higher level of certainty than that contained in 
the final report, and that it was only through the peer review process that the 
initial conclusion went down one level to “high degree of probability.”103 
The State then presented the testimony of a second examiner (FDE #2), 
who testified that in his expert opinion, the defendant wrote the words and 
numbers on the yellow notepad to the exclusion of everyone else.104  He 
made a full identification, the highest conclusion in the field of forensic 
document examination.105  The State then had FDE #2 testify about the peer 
review of his findings, once again over defendant’s objection that such 
testimony constituted improper bolstering, as reflected by the following 
exchange:  
 
Q.         When you formulate that opinion within the context of the 
laboratory, for whom you worked at the time that you did this 
work, are there quality assurance controls in place within the 
context of that laboratory? 
 
A.         Yes, we have— 
 
Defendant:         Objection, Judge, bolstering. 
 
Court:                 Okay, I’m sorry.  The objection is bolstering? 
 
Defendant:          Bolstering, I’m sorry. 
 
Court:                 Overruled. 
 
Q.         And could you explain to the members of the jury what 
those quality assurance controls are? 
 
A.         We have two different types of quality assurance 
processes, one is a technical review and one is a confirmation.  
Technical review, every tenth case normally that is examined is 
reexamined by another examiner to ensure that the protocols have 
been followed, the standards have been applied, and that the notes 
and findings or that the notes, diagrams or whatever actually 
support the conclusion that is being offered.  Additionally, in our 
laboratory, whenever there was an identification made, a separate 
examiner is required to independently examine the evidence 
associated with that case and reach his or her own conclusion.  The 
 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 584. 
 105  Id. 
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identification would only go out of the laboratory based on our 
own protocols if there’s confirmation. 
 
Q.         And did you have that in this case? 
 
A.         Yes, sir, I did.106 
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the State’s two document examiners to testify about peer reviews 
performed by other non-testifying examiners.107  In reversing the defendant’s 
conviction, the appellate court agreed with the defense that the peer review 
testimony constituted improper bolstering and was not harmless, providing 
the following elucidating legal analysis:   
 
In Schwarz v. State, we held that an expert may not testify that he 
formed his opinion by consulting with others in the same field.  
Subsequently, we extended the reach of that concept to preclude 
an expert from bolstering—his own opinion on direct examination 
with that of another expert.”  We explained that this prohibitive 
rule applies equally whether the expert relies on a second expert’s 
opinion or testifies about other experts’ opinions in explaining the 
process employed. 
 
Here, the defendant specifically lodged a bolstering objection to 
both examiners testifying about the process and called the court’s 
attention to our decision in Bunche.  Nevertheless, the court 
overruled the objections and permitted the testimony.  In doing so, 
the trial court erred.  We must next decide if the error was 
harmless. 
 
In State v. DiGuilio, our supreme court explained that: The 
harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state . . . to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict or . . . that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 
 
Here, as in Bunche, the handwriting examiners testified that they 
“use[d] . . . a second examiner in the verification process.” The 
first examiner testified that, “in our laboratory, whenever there 
was an identification made, a separate examiner is required to 
independently examine the evidence associated with that case and 
 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 585. 
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reach his or her own conclusion.  The identification would only go 
out of the laboratory based on our protocols if there’s 
confirmation.”  The second examiner testified that, “the high 
degree of probability . . . was the conclusion that exited the 
laboratory due to the peer review process that we follow.”  Both 
of these comments improperly bolstered the testifying experts’ 
findings because they relied on the “use of a second examiner in 
the verification process.” 
 
The State argues that no improper bolstering occurred because the 
experts “were simply providing a general explanation of the [peer 
review] process.”  While that may be true, it does not eliminate 
the harm of admitting the opinions of non-testifying experts to 
bolster the testimony of those testifying.  Instead, it deprives the 
opposing party of the opportunity to cross-examine the non-
testifying experts.  This was the reasoning in Bunche, 
notwithstanding that we found the error harmless there. 
 
The State attempts to distinguish Telfort and Bunche because it 
presented two independent experts instead of one.  The State 
argues the expert examiners’ testimony was properly admitted 
because their conclusions “were consistent with each other.”  Two 
wrongs do not make a right.  Two instances of inadmissible 
bolstering testimony do not ameliorate the harm and prejudice 
simply because the experts come to the same conclusion.  Rather, 
two instances double the harm. 
 
The State also suggests that Telfort, Bunche, and Potts v. State 
conflict with cases from the Third and Fifth Districts.  We 
disagree.  J.V. and Masters involved expert witnesses rendering 
an opinion after reviewing “facts and data.”  Such testimony is 
entirely permissible under the Florida Evidence Code.  There 
simply is no conflict. 
 
Because the defendant contested the experts’ conclusions that he 
wrote the words and numbers on the yellow notepad, and those 
opinions are the only real direct evidence placing the defendant at 
the scene of the crime, we cannot find the error harmless.108 
 
 
 108  Id. at 585–86 (citations omitted).  In Bunche, the court held the error to be harmless 
because there was no dispute that the prints belonged to the defendant—the question was 
when the defendant’s prints were left at the scene.  Bunche v. State, 5 So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
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However, despite the well-reasoned opinion of the Florida District Court 
of Appeal, prior case law from other states reflects differing opinions on 
whether testimony about verification by a non-testifying expert should be 
allowed or excluded on evidentiary grounds.109 
VI. GATEKEEPING: TRIAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS ARE STILL LARGELY 
INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF UNRELIABLE OR 
EXAGGERATED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
        The 2009 NAS Report recommended that the handling of forensic 
science evidence in court be vastly improved, emphasizing the need to 
challenge poor and marginal evidence from traditional forensic science 
disciplines and to prevent the admissibility of unreliable or exaggerated 
opinion evidence.110 Unfortunately, very little improvement has been seen in 
this area of great concern to the interests of justice.111  This may be due to 
how members of the bench and bar have traditionally viewed their respective 
roles.  Although all judges will acknowledge the need to exclude expert 
opinions that are so weak or speculative that they would tend to mislead or 
confuse the jury, many still seem to have difficulty in distinguishing between 
opinion evidence that is shaky but admissible from that which is unreliable 
and inadmissible.112 Perhaps out of fear of being reversed on appeal, judges 
may be too reluctant to exclude proffered evidence as being unreliable, 
preferring instead to let that issue be resolved through the traditional means 
of attacking weak or marginal evidence: cross-examination and presentation 
of contrary proof.113  Regrettably, experience has shown that far too many 
 
 109  Prior decisions from other states disallowing such testimony include: Bell v. State, 724 
S.W.2d 780, 800–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (explaining the question of whether a fingerprint 
expert’s ID of a print was verified by another expert is improper since it is an attempt to 
bolster the testifying expert’s testimony, although such a question would be proper as a 
predicate to introducing the second technician’s analysis); State v. Wicker, 832 P.2d 127, 
128–30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Smith, 628 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); 
State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928, 930–32 (N.H. 2007) (explaining fingerprint expert’s testimony 
regarding another expert’s verification is inadmissible hearsay, as the verification did not form 
a basis for the testifying expert’s opinion, but was simply a prerequisite to the release of his 
already formed opinion).  Two prior decisions allowing such testimony are State v. Jones, 368 
S.E.2d 844, 846–49 (N.C. 1988) (finding trial court properly permitted a fingerprint expert to 
testify that another expert had checked and concurred with the testifying expert’s conclusion, 
because under the standard procedures followed by the expert, he could not have arrived at 
and testified to his opinion without the verification by the other expert); State v. Williams, 
No. 95CA93, 1996 WL753216 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (permitting fingerprint expert’s 
testimony that he had his results verified by another fingerprint expert).   
 110  See 2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 4, 48.   
 111  Keelah E.G. Williams & Michael J. Saks, Why Don’t the Gatekeepers Guard the 
Gates?: Comments Prompted by Edmond, 36 ADELAIDE L. REV. 109–24 (2015). 
 112  Id. 
 113  Even the Advisory Committee Note to FRE 702 provides that “rejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule” and that “[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper 
is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.”  FED. R. EVID. 702 
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trial lawyers are ill-equipped to challenge unreliable expert testimony, 
especially in the criminal justice system, where defense attorneys lack the 
resources needed to obtain the expertise required to successfully challenge 
such testimony. 
A. The Responsibility of Gatekeepers Regarding Proffered Expert 
Testimony 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 (FRE 702) provides: 
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: 
 
a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
 
b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
 
c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
 
d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.114 
 
   To be admissible under FRE 702, the expert and/or the lawyer offering 
the expert testimony must provide the trial judge with a warrant for believing 
that (a) the expert possesses sufficient skill with regard to performing the 
particular task at hand, and (b) reliable inferences can be drawn from the 
reliable performance of that particular task.115 
   As the gatekeeper entrusted with determining whether to admit or 
exclude expert testimony, scrutiny of the proffered expert’s qualifications is 
but one factor that the trial judge must consider.  Once the proffered witness 
is qualified as an expert, the trial court’s gatekeeping function requires more 
than simply “taking the expert’s word for it” and allowing the witness to 
testify simply because he or she was qualified as an expert. Before any 
 
advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.   
 114  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 115  The Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael made it clear that the 
evaluation must be directed to the reliability of the expertise in the specific “task at hand.”  
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
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proffered expert testimony can be admitted, the trial judge must also 
scrutinize the relevance and reliability of the proffered testimony. 
 Under FRE 702, as under Daubert116 and Kumho,117 trial courts must118 
scrutinize not only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also 
whether those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts 
of the case.  When an expert purports to apply principles and methods in 
accordance with professional standards, yet reaches a conclusion that other 
experts in the field would not reach, the trial court may fairly suspect that the 
principles and methods have not been faithfully applied.119  “Any step that 
renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony 
inadmissible.  This is true whether the step completely changes a reliable 
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.”120 
B. Factors Relevant and Material to Properly Assessing the 
Reliability of Proffered Opinion Evidence Under Rule 702 
The most effective way for a court to evaluate reliability and the 
likelihood of error associated with proffered expert testimony is to examine 
with critical common sense the methodology used and reasons given for a 
conclusion under the circumstances of the specific task at hand in the case.121  
This requires evaluating the reasoning used in forming an expert opinion and 
determining if it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.  
As long as the court’s analysis focuses on the expert’s methods and 
reasoning, and not on the expert’s conclusions, its actions are proper.122 
Trial judges must consider various factors in determining whether expert 
testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.  The 
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended 
in 2011, describes three factors that are relevant and material to properly 
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence as follows: 
 
a) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an 
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; 
 
b) whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious 
alternative explanations; and 
 
 116  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 117  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 118  Rule 702 not only vests the trial judge with the authority to scrutinize and evaluate the 
expert’s methodology and reasoning, it requires the trial judge to do so. Claar v. Burlington 
N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 119  See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 120  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 121  This was the guidance offered by the Supreme Court in Kumho.  See Kumho, 526 U.S. 
at 149.   
 122  See Kennedy v. Collagen, 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998).   
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c) whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his 
regular professional work outside his paid litigation 
consulting.”123 
 
   For trial judges to make a meaningful reliability assessment using the 
above criteria, they need to know the discipline’s best practices and 
guidelines for performing the task at hand, as set forth in consensus standards 
adopted by the profession, learned treatises, and relevant case law.  Such 
knowledge is essential to performing the gatekeeping task of distinguishing 
between evidence that is shaky and admissible from that which is unreliable 
and inadmissible. 
   When an expert’s departure from an acknowledged professional 
standard or best practice can be shown to have produced an illogical or 
exaggerated opinion, the decision to exclude such an opinion should become 
relatively straightforward.  However, a review of relevant appellate court 
decisions shows this to be easier said than done. 
C. Court Decisions Illustrating Unreliable and Critically Flawed 
Testimony on the Part of Presumptively Well-Qualified 
Handwriting Experts That Should Have Been Excluded by the 
Trial Judge 
1. Improper Methodology—Using Exemplar Signatures of a 
Remote Date to Support an Opinion of Forgery 
Hardin v. Montgomery,124 a Kentucky case involving allegations of 
election misconduct and violations of the Corrupt Practices Act, provides a 
good example of an appellate court conducting the necessary reliability 
assessment of handwriting identification opinion evidence after the trial 
court failed to do so.  The trial court admitted expert testimony concerning 
voter signatures, with ABFDE Diplomate Thomas W. Vastrick125 and BFDE 
 
 123  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment (“Daubert requires 
the trial court to assure itself that the expert ‘employs in the courtroom the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’” (quoting 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).   
 124  Hardin v. Montgomery, No. 2015-CA-000305, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 94 (Ky. Ct. 
App. June 12, 2015).   
 125  Mr. Vastrick was and is a presumptively well-qualified FDE, having been, inter alia, 
certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE), Chair of the 
Questioned Document Section of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), and 
a longstanding member of the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners 
(ASQDE).   
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Diplomate Steven A. Slyter126 testifying for opposite sides.127  Mr. Vastrick 
testified that the signatures of forty-three voters did not match the signatures 
on their voter registration cards, which was the only reference exemplar he 
used for comparison purposes.128  All the comparisons performed by Mr. 
Vastrick were based upon photocopies and consisted solely of one-to-one 
comparisons between the challenged voter signature and the signature 
appearing on the named individual’s voter registration card.  Of the thirty-
eight dated signature pairs compared by Montgomery’s expert (Mr. 
Vastrick), seven pairs had time differences of forty plus years, eleven pairs 
had time differences of thirty to thirty-nine years, four pairs had time 
differences of twenty to twenty-nine years, and seven pairs had time 
differences of ten to nineteen years.129  FDE Slyter testified that the 
methodology employed by Mr. Vastrick violated established professional 
standards and best practices for performing handwriting comparisons and 
was wholly improper and unreliable.130  Based in large part on Mr. Vastrick’s 
testimony the trial court found, inter alia, voter fraud and other election law 
violations, and voided the election.131  The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
affirmed by a 2-1 vote132 over a blistering dissent by Judge Thompson, who, 
in evaluating Vastrick’s methodology, found it to be fundamentally 
unreliable and critically flawed, stating: 
 
 126  Mr. Slyter was and is a presumptively well-qualified FDE, having been, inter alia, 
certified by the Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE), President of the BFDE, a 
longstanding member of the Association of Forensic Document Examiners (AFDE), and 
author of a well-recognized treatise on forensic signature analysis, FORENSIC SIGNATURE 
EXAMINATION, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield (1995).   
 127  There are two boards that certify forensic document examiners, both of which are 
accredited by the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board (FSAB), which was established in 
2000 by the National Institute of Justice, the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and 
the National Forensic Science Technology Center to serve the same function for forensic 
science disciplines as that served for medical specialties by the American Board of Medical 
Specialties.  See Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board, Inc., (Mar. 16, 2018), 
http://thefsab.org/.  The Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE) was the first board 
to be accredited by FSAB in 2006; the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners 
(AFDE) became FSAB-accredited in 2007.  Document examiners certified by either of these 
Boards are designated as “Diplomates.”   
 128  Id. at *9. 
 129  Forensic Document Examination Report of Thomas W. Vastrick, Montgomery v. 
Magoffin Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 14-ci-00371, 2015 WL 4876464 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 
2015) (on file with author); Transcript of Record, Montgomery, 2015 WL 4876464 (Thomas 
W. Vastrick’s Testimony) (on file with author).   
 130  This was derived from court opinions (see supra note 124, infra note 134) and 
supplemented by information provided by Steven Slyter, including the Magoffin County 
Kentucky Circuit Court video of his testimony on February 9, 2015, which is on file with 
author. 
 131  Hardin v. Montgomery, No. 2015-CA-000305, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 94, at *36 (Ky. 
Ct. App. June 12, 2015). 
 132  Id. at 11. 
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
690 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631 
 
Montgomery’s handwriting expert, Thomas Vastrick, provided 
only marginally reliable evidence of forgeries.  The other 
handwriting expert, Stephen Styler [sic], testified that Vastrick’s 
one-to-one comparison of signatures was an unreliable method 
and could not establish any forgeries.  Even our case law teaches 
that comparison of a single signature with a challenged signature 
is not a reliable method to determine the authenticity of the 
signature.133 
 
        The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certiorari to review the case, 
and on August 16, 2016, issued an opinion134 reversing the Court of Appeals, 
and stating, inter alia: 
 
Montgomery introduced at the trial the testimony of Thomas 
Vastrick, an expert on handwriting analysis who had examined 
voter signatures on the election day voter roster at the Flat Fork 
precinct and on the absentee ballot materials.  Vastrick opined that 
the signatures of forty-three Flat Fork voters did not match the 
corresponding signature on the voter’s voter registration card; that 
fourteen voter signatures on voting precinct forms did not match, 
and that twenty-six voter signatures on the absentee ballots did not 
match the corresponding signature on the voter’s absentee ballot 
application.  The implication of his opinion is that eighty-three 
votes cast in the names of those voters were cast by imposters who 
forged the signatures of the registered voter.  Only two of the 
eighty-three voters were called as witnesses and both refuted the 
insinuated forgery.  Both verified the authenticity of their 
signatures on the voting roster and attested to having personally 
cast the votes recorded in their names.  One of the voters explained 
that her current signature might look different than the signature 
on her voter registration card because the latter was signed thirty 
years prior, when she was eighteen, and the former was signed on 
election day.  The other voter testified that he was left-handed, and 
because he had a broken left arm on election day he had to sign 
the voter roster with his right hand.  None of the other voters 
whose election day signature was identified by Vastrick as suspect 
were called to testify.  Montgomery’s attempt to demonstrate that 
imposters cast ballots in place of legitimate registered voters by 
forging their signatures falls woefully short.  Proving the 
suspected forgeries would have been relatively easy because the 
names and addresses of the eighty-three voters whose signatures 
 
 133  Id. at 14 (citation omitted). 
 134  Hardin v. Montgomery, 495 S.W.3d 686 (Ky. 2016).   
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were suspect were readily available. 
 
Appellants refuted Vastrick’s opinion with the countervailing 
analysis by their handwriting expert, Stephen Styler [sic].  
Ultimately, Vastrick conceded that he used an unreliable method 
of handwriting comparison and could not definitively establish 
any forgeries.  In this vein, our predecessor court has 
acknowledged that the comparison of a single signature with a 
challenged signature is not a reliable method to determine the 
authenticity of the signature in question.135 
 
   Unfortunately, Mr. Vastrick is not the only presumptively well-
qualified handwriting expert to commit this fundamental type of error, and 
Hardin is not an isolated case of unreliable handwriting identification 
opinion evidence escaping detection and exclusion at the trial level.  For 
instance, only a few years earlier, in another civil case involving questioned 
voter signatures, Felder v. Storobin,136 a New York appellate court 
discredited the same type of unreliable handwriting testimony on the part of 
another presumptively well-qualified document examiner,137 who likewise 
based an opinion of forgery on perceived differences appearing in signatures 
of a remote date. 
2. Illogical (Unfounded) Conclusion—Unjustifiably 
Extrapolating from an Accepted Premise to an Unfounded 
Conclusion 
   Adams v. Weber138 involved an action brought by Samuel D. Adams, 
a/k/a Dale S. White, pursuant to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Adams claimed that his court-appointed defense attorney (Brankin) provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel when representing him in connection with 
a 2001 criminal case.139 
   As described in the South Dakota Circuit Court’s memorandum 
decision, the underlying criminal prosecution arose out of an incident that 
occurred while Gayle Wanous (“Ms. Wanous”) was working alone in her 
 
 135  Id. at 706–07 (citing Beauchamp v. Willis, 189 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ky. 1945)).   
 136  953 N.Y.S.2d 602 (App. Div. 2012). 
 137  The handwriting expert who testified in this case was employed for thirty years with a 
state police crime laboratory that allowed him to accept private sector civil casework; he was 
board-certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) and was 
a long-standing member of the Questioned Document Section of the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences (AAFS) and the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners 
(ASQDE). The expert’s curriculum vitae and background information are on file with author. 
 138  2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2005).   
 139  Id. at *7. 
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flower shop.140  A Native American man entered the shop, identified himself 
as Sam Adams, and said that he was on his lunch break from Dakota 
Connection and wanted to buy some flowers for his girlfriend.  As the 
customer started to write out an enclosure card at the counter, he asked Ms. 
Wanous to add something to his order.141  When Ms. Wanous went to a back 
workroom to get something, she was struck from behind on the head.  When 
she awoke, she had no recollection of what had happened.  After cleaning 
the blood from her hands and head, she immediately called the police upon 
noticing that her cash drawer was open and all the cash and checks had been 
taken.142  Shortly after Chief Flannery and Sergeant Fisher of the Sisseton 
Police Department arrived at the scene, Ms. Wanous was taken by 
ambulance to a hospital where she remained for five days after her injuries 
were discovered to include a four-inch cut to the back of her head, a fractured 
skull, and a concussion.  Four days after being discharged from the hospital, 
Ms. Wanous provided the police with her initial statement regarding the 
incident, and several days later (two weeks after the incident), Ms. Wanous 
identified Adams from a photo lineup as the person who was in her store at 
the time she was attacked.143  Defendant Sam Adams was subsequently 
prosecuted for aggravated assault, first-degree robbery, and first-degree 
burglary.  A jury found Adams guilty of all three counts and he was 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.144 
   The only physical evidence recovered from the scene that might link 
the defendant to the crime was the small enclosure card found on the counter 
that contained the hand printed phrase “To Karen From Sam.”  No other 
physical evidence was recovered to connect Adams to the crime scene—no 
fingerprints, no blood, no DNA.145 
   In granting Sam Adams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Circuit 
Court determined that the defense attorney’s laziness and complete 
incompetence undermined every aspect of Adams’ defense.  The Court cited 
numerous instances of gross ineptitude on the part of the indigent 
defendant’s court-appointed attorney, with perhaps the most damaging one 
being his total lack of preparation concerning handwriting analysis.146  With 
 
 140  Id. at *1. 
 141  Id. at *2. 
 142  Id. at *3. 
 143  Id. at *5–6. 
 144  Adams, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 at *1–6, *30.   
 145  Id.   
 146  Id. at *44.  Defense attorney Brankin failed to request, let alone consult with, an expert 
in forensic document examination, and stipulated to the State’s use of a handwriting expert 
two weeks before the start of the trial.  “Brankin did not review Runyon’s report prior to trial, 
and had no knowledge of the technical standards used in handwriting analysis. . . . The skills 
and diligence Brankin exhibited in regards to this issue fell well outside the objective standard 
of reasonableness expected from competent trial counsel.”  Id. at *44–45.   
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respect to the trial testimony of the State’s handwriting expert, the Court 
noted: 
 
The State’s case against Adams was largely circumstantial in 
nature.  The State did not produce any witnesses to the alleged 
crimes, other than the victim.  The Sisseton Police Department did 
not collect any evidence that directly tied Adams to the scene of 
the crime.  No fingerprints, weapon, or money was ever recovered.  
A major piece of physical evidence presented to the jury was the 
enclosure card left on Wanous’ counter.  As related earlier, it was 
inscribed with the words “To Karen, From Sam.”  However, the 
handwriting on the card was unnatural stick writing rather than 
normal printing.  The State alleged this card was written by 
Adams.  The defense maintained Adams did not write the card, 
and believed Sergeant Fisher forged it as evidence against Adams. 
 
The State employed a forensic document examiner, Karen 
Runyon, as an expert to analyze the handwriting on the card. 
Brankin never attempted to employ his own handwriting expert, 
and never educated himself on the area of handwriting analysis.  
Approximately two weeks before the start of trial he stipulated to 
the use of Runyon as the handwriting expert without fully 
reviewing the contents of her report. 
 
Prior to issuing her report, Runyon received writing exemplars of 
both Adams and Fisher that were analyzed against the card.  
Runyon stated that she received an inconclusive result when she 
analyzed Adams’ handwriting, but that she could conclusively 
rule out Sergeant Fisher as the author.  At trial, Runyon testified 
to her inconclusive finding in regards to Adams, but went on to 
detail similarities between Adams handwriting and the card.  
Brankin allowed her to give lengthy testimony on the issue 
without challenging her conclusions or prompting her to detail the 
similarities between the two.147 
 
   Ms. Runyon testified that she had been employed as a FDE with the 
Minneapolis Police Department since 1978, and had also been accepting 
private sector civil casework assignments since 1988.148  Her professional 
training included a four-year apprenticeship with the Questioned Document 
Unit of the Indiana State Police, FBI and US Secret Service training courses, 
 
 147  Id. at *26–27. 
 148  Transcript of Record at 381–86, Adams v. Weber, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 (S.D. Cir. 
Ct. 2001) (No. 03-107) (Karen Runyon’s Testimony); Karen Runyon’s Curriculum Vitae (on 
file with author).   
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and attendance at symposiums and workshops sponsored by professional 
membership organizations in the field.149  She was a member of the 
Questioned Document Section of the AAFS and the Midwestern Association 
of Forensic Scientists (MAFS).  Although not board certified, she had 
testified approximately 190 times in local, state, and federal courts.150 
   At the habeas hearing, Adams presented evidence from three 
handwriting experts: Allan Keown, Vickie Willard, and Pat Girouard. All 
three experts, two of whom (Willard and Girouard) were Diplomates of the 
Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE),151 echoed essentially the 
same concerns about the impropriety of comparing two sets of writings not 
suitable for comparison, and Ms. Runyon’s bias in overstating an 
inconclusive opinion and providing disingenuous testimony.152  Each opined 
that Ms. Runyon was allowed to offer improper opinions that contravened 
the technical standards of handwriting analysis, and that Adams’ defense 
attorney was not familiar with those standards and wholly unprepared to 
meaningfully challenge the admissibility of Runyon’s opinions or to 
impeach and discredit her testimony.  The two technical standards at issue 
were American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards, one 
establishing best practices for performing handwriting examinations and the 
other defining the standard terminology used by forensic document 
examiners in expressing conclusions.  Willard pointed out that as an active 
member of ASTM Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents, 
Runyon had actually participated in writing and developing the two ASTM 
standards at issue.153 
   The technical deficiencies of the handwriting opinions and biased 
nature of the trial testimony presented by Ms. Runyon (the State’s expert) 
are specifically described below. 
i. Incomparability of Writing Features: The Significance of 
the Questioned Hand Printing Being Unnatural Stick 
Printing and the Exemplars Being Natural Printing. 
 Ms. Runyon testified that the enclosure card found at the crime scene 
was “written in unnatural stick printing . . . as a means of disguise.”  Both 
Sam Adams’ exemplars and Sergeant Fisher’s exemplars were admittedly 
written in natural printing.154 
 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id.  
 151  See supra note 126; Board of Forensic Document Examiners, http://www.bfde.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018).   
 152  Affidavit of Vickie L. Willard (Mar. 11, 2004) (on file with the author); Report of 
Allan Keown (Nov. 30, 2003) (on file with the author); Affidavit of Pat Girouard (Mar. 11, 
2004) (on file with the author). 
 153  Affidavit of Vickie L. Willard, supra note 152.   
 154  Transcript of Record, supra note 148, at 416.   
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 In comparing questioned writing consisting of unnatural stick printing 
with exemplars consisting only of natural printing, Ms. Runyon departed 
from the standard methodology and recognized best practices set forth in 
ASTM Standard E2290-03, Standard Guide for Examination of Handwritten 
Items (ASTM Standard E2290),155 which provides: 
 
§ 7.6.1: If [the questioned writing] is not natural writing, or . . . 
the available questioned writing is not suitable for comparison, 
discontinue these procedures and report accordingly. 
 
§ 7.9.1: If [the known writing] is not natural writing, or . . . the 
available questioned writing is not suitable for comparison, 
discontinue these procedures and report accordingly. 
 
§ 7.11.1:  If the bodies of writing are not comparable, discontinue 
comparison and request comparable known writing, if 
appropriate. 
 
ii. Distorting an Inconclusive Opinion in a Manner That 
Favors a Particular Outcome 
   Ms. Runyon’s conclusion as to whether Sam Adams wrote the 
unnatural stick printing on the enclosure card (marked at trial as “Exhibit 4”) 
was stated to be “inconclusive”, as indicated by the following excerpt from 
the official transcript of her direct testimony: 
 
Q:  When you did your comparison of Exhibit 4 to the items related 
to Sam Adams’ handwriting, what was your conclusion from the 
comparison? 
 
A:  My conclusion was that I was inconclusive.  There were both 
similarities to Mr. Adams’ writing, as well as characteristics that 
were not found in the sample that I had of this writer.  So based 
on the combination of what I had and what I did not have, I 
determined that with what was submitted that, actually, a 
conclusion could not be rendered in one direction or another.156 
 
 
 155  ASTM INTERNATIONAL, ASTM STANDARD E2290-03: STANDARD GUIDE FOR 
EXAMINATION OF HANDWRITTEN ITEMS 3 (2003).   
 156  Transcript of Record, supra note 148, at 392 (emphasis added).   
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   ASTM Standard E1658-96, Standard Terminology for Expressing 
Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners (ASTM Standard E1658),157 
recommends and defines several terms that FDEs should use to express the 
level of confidence associated with their opinion(s); it provides a 
standardized framework for understanding the true meaning of the level of 
confidence associated with an opinion or conclusion expressed by a FDE.  As 
defined in ASTM Standard E1658, the terms “inconclusive” and 
“indeterminable” are synonymous and represent “the zero point of the 
confidence scale”; these terms are “used when there are significant limiting 
factors, such as disguise in the questioned and/or known writing or a lack of 
comparable writing, and the examiner does not have a leaning one way or the 
other.”158 
   Once Ms. Runyon expressed an inconclusive opinion as to whether 
Sam Adams wrote the card and testified that no conclusion could be reached 
one way or the other, the only proper and accurate statement that she could 
make was that Sam Adams “cannot be eliminated or identified as the writer.”  
However, Ms. Runyon chose to embellish her testimony with an inaccurate 
and misleading statement designed to support the prosecution-favored 
outcome, as reflected in the following exchange during her direct testimony: 
 
Q:  Ms. Runyon, you’re not saying that Sam did not write this 
card? 
 
A:  No. You cannot eliminate him as a writer, no. 
 
Q:  But you’re not saying that he did? 
 
A:  Neither can you identify him positively as the writer, no.159 
(Emphasis added) 
 
   Ms. Runyon’s gratuitous inclusion of the word “positively” in 
testifying that Sam Adams cannot be eliminated or positively identified as 
the writer clearly manifested bias in favor of the prosecution.  This 
overstatement was highly prejudicial to the defendant because it wrongfully 
implied a “near match,” i.e., that the defendant can be identified as the writer, 
but just not positively.  This form of disingenuous testimony is not 
uncommon in criminal cases involving prosecution handwriting experts who 
appear to be unduly influenced or motivated to testify in a manner that 
 
 157  ASTM INTERNATIONAL, ASTM STANDARD E1658-96: STANDARD TERMINOLOGY FOR 
EXPRESSING CONCLUSIONS OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS (1996).   
 158  Id. at 2.   
 159  ASTM STANDARD E1658-96, supra note 157, at 1.   
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suggests support for the inculpatory hypothesis even when the evidence itself 
favors neither the inculpatory nor exculpatory hypothesis. 
iii. Misinterpreting Evidence or Providing Exaggerated 
Testimony to Support a Favored Outcome 
   The defense maintained that Adams did not write the card, and 
suggested that Officer Fisher fabricated it as evidence against Adams.160  The 
following excerpt of Runyon’s trial testimony concerns the results of her 
examination and comparison of the unnatural stick printing on the enclosure 
card with the naturally written hand printing exemplars of Officer Fisher: 
 
Q:  What was your conclusion from the comparison of Officer 
Fisher’s known handwriting to the questioned document? 
 
A:  My conclusion was that it was highly probable that he was not 
the writer of the questioned material.161  (Emphasis added) 
 
   ASTM Standard E1658, supra, defines “highly probable” as meaning 
that “the evidence is very persuasive” and “the examiner is virtually certain” 
of the conclusion (opinion) expressed.162  Hence, Ms. Runyon concluded that 
Officer Fisher could be eliminated with virtual certainty as the writer of the 
unnatural stick printing appearing on the enclosure card. 
   As noted earlier, no conclusion could be rendered in one direction or 
another regarding authorship of the questioned writing because the unnatural 
stick printing appearing on the card was not suitable for comparison with the 
naturally written exemplars available for both Adams and Officer Fisher. 
Accordingly, an inconclusive opinion was warranted with respect to whether 
Officer Fisher wrote the enclosure card for the same reason Ms. Runyon 
reached an inconclusive opinion with respect to whether defendant Adams 
wrote the card – unnatural stick printing cannot be compared to natural 
printing. 
   The only way Officer Fisher could have properly been eliminated as 
the writer of the enclosure card was by evidence showing that his writing 
skills were so impaired as to have made it impossible for him to produce the 
 
 160  The Circuit Court pointed out inconsistencies in the trial testimony of the two police 
officers that responded to the crime scene. “Chief Flannery and the victim both testified the 
victim did not give the officers a physical description of the perpetrator. Sergeant Fisher stated 
the victim did provide a description. The two officers testified inconsistently as to who arrived 
before whom at the Treasure Chest. They both testified that the other was the officer to 
actually pick up the enclosure card from Wanous’ counter. They both stated that they 
considered the other officer to be in charge of the investigation.” Adams v. Weber, No. 03-
107, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1, at *34–35 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2005).   
 161  See supra note 148, at 415.   
 162  See supra note 157, at 1, § 4.1.   
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unnatural stick printing at issue. Such evidence being absent, the inclination 
on the part of the prosecution’s handwriting expert to disassociate the 
disguised hand printing on the enclosure card from the natural hand printing 
of Officer Fisher clearly reflects a biased conclusion derived from an 
illogical interpretation of evidence, presumably resulting from Ms. Runyon’s 
adoption of an adversarial role in which the outcome-oriented goal trumped 
the truth-seeking goal. 
3. Improper Methodology—Relying Solely Upon Post Litem 
Motem Signatures Supplied by A Disclaiming Signatory to 
Support an Opinion of Forgery (the Almeciga case) 
  Returning to Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, discussed 
in regard to the role of verification, supra, the plaintiff in the case denied 
having signed or even seen the key document, a Release.163  As previously 
noted, the putative expert called by the defense was Wendy Carlson.  Ms. 
Carlson had compared the contested signature to several “known” examples 
provided by the plaintiff and concluded that the contested signature was a 
forgery.  All the known samples Carlson used were signed well after the 
litigation commenced (post litem motem exemplars).  Following a Daubert 
hearing, U.S. District Court Judge Jed. S. Rakoff of the Southern District of 
New York excluded the proffered testimony of plaintiff’s handwriting 
expert, Wendy Carlson, finding that her testimony was far too problematic 
to be admissible under Rule 702 as technical or otherwise ‘specialized’ 
expert testimony, even on a Kumho Tire approach,”164 and that her 
“methodology [was] fundamentally unreliable and critically flawed in so 
many respects [that her] testimony would be more likely to obfuscate the 
issues in the case than to ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine an issue.’”165 
        Judge Rakoff cited the following four factors as contributing to his 
conclusion that Carlson’s handwriting opinion was unreliable and 
inadmissible: 
 
1) Bias (Carlson knew the favored outcome from the 
start)166 
2) “The subjectivity and vagueness of Carlson’s analysis 
severely diminishes the reliability of Carlson’s 
 
 163  Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016). 
 164  Id. at 424.   
 165  Id. at 426.   
 166  Judge Rakoff pointed out how the attorney who retained Ms. Carlson had engaged in 
“blatant biasing tactics [that] compromised Ms. Carlson’s ability to provide a neutral 
examination, a danger made even greater by the highly subjective nature of Carlson’s 
methodology.”  Id. at 425.   
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methodology.”167 
 (3) Carlson’s analysis is “critically flawed” because she failed 
to consider the possibility of disguise—that the disclaiming 
signatory provided disguised signature exemplars when the 
evidence clearly suggested that to be the case;168 and 
 (4) Striking contradictions between Carlson’s reports and in-
court testimony “diminished Carlson’s credibility”169 such as: 
         (a) Carlson claimed to use ACE-V, but due to time 
constraints, omitted the V (Verification),170 discussed in Part V.B, 
supra. 
            (b) Carlson’s initial report stated that “the signature on the 
Release was ‘made to resemble’ Plaintiffs,” but Carlson’s in-court 
testimony acknowledged that the Release signature and the known 
signatures “weren’t even close” and that the Release signature 
“was not like an attempted forgery.” 
 
   Of the above four factors, only Ms. Carlson’s use of the self-serving 
post litem motem exemplars supplied by the disclaiming signatory was 
expressly stated by Judge Rakoff to have rendered Ms. Carlson’s analysis 
“critically flawed.”  As indicated supra, this departure from standard 
methodology is acknowledged to be one of the principle sources of error in 
opinions declaring a signature to be forgery.  Hence, this factor alone 
sufficed to render Ms. Carlson’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under 
Rule 702, especially given the fact that Judge Rakoff’s own inquiry led him 
to view documents filed in other state court proceedings that contained ante 
litem motem exemplar signatures of the plaintiff which he observed to be 
remarkably similar to the contested signature she denied having signed or 
even seen.171  Moreover, Judge Rakoff properly inferred that Ms. Carlson 
 
 167  Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426.   
 168  Id.   
 169  Id.   
 170  Id.   
 171  “[W]hile testimony that accounted for the possibility of disguise and addressed why 
the ‘known’ signatures were not the product of intentional disguise could at least have 
potentially assisted the trier of fact, Carlson did not offer such testimony. To the contrary, 
Carlson confirmed at her deposition that she was ‘relying on the plaintiff’s representations 
that [the known signatures] are accurate representations of her signature.’ This is a critical 
flaw in Carlson’s methodology because it assumes away a key issue: whether Almeciga 
intentionally disguised her handwriting in producing the known samples after this dispute was 
initiated or whether the known samples accurately represent her actual handwriting. By 
relying on plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that the ‘known’ signatures were accurate 
representations of plaintiff’s signature, the result of Carlson’s analysis was effectively pre-
ordained and her testimony cannot be considered the ‘product of reliable principles and 
methods.’ In fact, Carlson’s testimony has been excluded by at least one other court in part 
on such a basis. See United States v. LeBeau, 2015 WL 4068158, at *8 (D.S.D. June 10, 2015) 
(‘[Carlson’s] analysis and opinions entirely hinge on whether she received an accurate 
‘known’ signature from [the defendant].’). The tainting effect of Carlson’s assumption in this 
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had to have been aware of the distinct possibility that Ms. Almeciga supplied 
her with disguised exemplar signatures because Ms. Carlson’s in-court 
testimony acknowledged that the contested signature and the exemplar 
(known) signatures “weren’t even close” and that the contested Release 
signature “was not like an attempted forgery.”172 
   In finding that “handwriting analysis is unlikely to meet the 
admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and that, in any 
event, Ms. Carlson’s testimony does not meet these standards,” Judge 
Rakoff’s use of the term “unlikely” implies something other than a definitive 
finding, whereas the use of the phrase “in any event” indicates that what 
follows constitutes the basis for his decision to exclude Ms. Carlson’s 
testimony. This is consistent with the opinion of U.S. District Court Judge 
Martinez in Crew Tile Distribution, which “[read] the exclusion of Carlson’s 
testimony in Almeciga as resting on a case-specific analysis under Kumho 
Tire,” and not on a general disqualification of forensic handwriting analysis 
under Daubert.173 
VII. CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEEDING 
FURTHER ALONG “THE PATH FORWARD” 
A. What the Community of FDE Practitioners Needs to Do 
1. Restate the Foundational Principles Supporting the 
Discipline of Forensic Handwriting Analysis as a Technical 
Skill 
  Unlike the Latent Print Examination community, the FDE community 
has been slow to abandon the claim of uniqueness as a foundational basis for 
forensic handwriting analysis.  Despite recent court decisions pointing out 
that uniqueness is something that has not been and probably never can be 
validated by empirical proof,174 and that it is not a prerequisite for the 
admissibility of handwriting identification opinion evidence as a technical 
skill under Rule 702, the FDE community has yet to come to terms with the 
 
regard may be gleaned from what she infers on the basis of her observation that the ‘signature 
on the questioned document is written with great fluidity and a faster speed, unlike the known 
signatures that display a slower, more methodical and unrefined style of writing.’ To Carlson, 
who took on faith that the ‘known’ signatures were accurate representations of plaintiff’s 
handwriting, this discrepancy is evidence that the Release was forged. Yet, at the Daubert 
hearing, Carlson confirmed that slower, methodical handwriting was equally consistent . . . or 
maybe even more consistent with someone trying to fake the known signatures[.]”Almeciga, 
185 F. Supp. 3d at 425–26 (citations omitted).  
 172  Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426.   
 173  Crew Tile Distribution, Inc. v. Porcelanosa L.A., Inc., No. 13-cv-3206, 2016 WL 
8608447, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2016).   
 174  See discussion of U.S. v. Kelly and U.S. v. Johnsted in supra Part II. 
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need to restate the foundational principles supporting the discipline of 
forensic handwriting analysis. 
  The theory of uniqueness needs to be replaced with a neuroscience 
model based upon motor control behavior and complexity theory, along the 
lines discussed in Part III of this Article.  Practitioners must abandon the 
practice of characterizing the discipline of forensic handwriting analysis as 
a “science,” or describing handwriting examinations as “scientific.”  FDEs 
need to acknowledge the subjectivity of forensic handwriting analysis and 
understand that the subjectivity of a claimed expertise does not preclude a 
court from finding that such expertise is sufficiently reliable as a technical 
skill to be admitted as opinion evidence under Rule 702, as under Daubert 
and Kumho Tire. 
2. Develop More Robust and Transparent Best Practice 
Standards for Examining Handwritten Items and Expressing 
Opinions in Reports and Testimony 
  The FDE community has been more active than any other forensic 
discipline in producing professional standards, having published an array of 
twenty-one standards through ASTM International, a private consensus 
standards development organization (SDO).175  Most of those standards were 
initially drafted by the FBI-funded Scientific Working Group for Forensic 
Document Examination (SWGDOC) and thereafter were revised and voted 
upon by members of ASTM’s Questioned Documents Subcommittee 
E30.02, one of several discipline-specific subcommittees operating under the 
umbrella of ASTM Main Committee E-30 on Forensic Science.176  
Unfortunately, the content of some of those standards was not without its 
critics, and the criteria used by E30.02 officers in classifying voting interests 
resulted in the filing of formal complaints and appeals alleging that the 
E30.02 Questioned Document subcommittee’s method of classifying voting 
interests produced an imbalance in stakeholder interests that contravened the 
SDO’s essential due process requirements.177  In April 2012, confronted with 
allegations of due process violations and of improperly using the ASTM 
standards development process to obtain an unfair economic advantage in 
the marketplace of forensic document examination services, the coalition of 
public sector subcommittee members opted to use their supermajority 
control of voting to shut down Subcommittee E30.02 and return to using the 
 
 175  See ASTM Int’l, Subcommittee E30.90 on Executive, https://www.astm.org/C
OMMIT/SUBCOMMIT/E3090.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 176  See ASTM Int’l, Standards Formerly Under the Jurisdiction of E30.02 on Questioned 
Documents, https://www.astm.org/COMMIT/forensic-docs/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2018). 
 177  Letter from Andrew Sulner to Steve Orthey, Sec’y, ASTM Committee of Technical 
Committee Operations (COTCO) (July 14, 2009) (on file with author).   
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SWGDOC group to generate best practice standards for the FDE 
profession.178 
  Since best practice standards and guidelines produced by professional 
organizations or Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) do not meet the 
requirements of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA)179 for being voluntary consensus standards, the American 
Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) established in 2016 an SDO called 
the AAFS Academy Standards Board (ASB) to develop voluntary consensus 
standards, technical reports and best practice recommendations for forensic 
science disciplines.  The ASB has been accredited by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI), which requires that all SDOs adhere to certain 
essential requirements to ensure that its procedures for developing voluntary 
consensus standards adhere to principles of fundamental fairness.  These 
requirements include openness (transparency), balance of stakeholder 
interests, due process, and a meaningful appeals process.180  Perhaps the 
biggest challenge facing the ASB will be to ensure that its forensic standards 
development process is not dominated by a single stakeholder interest and 
that the standards it promulgates do not conflict with standards proposed by 
NIST, which formed the Organization of Scientific Area Committees 
(OSAC) for Forensic Science “to strengthen the nation’s use of forensic 
science by facilitating the development of technically sound forensic science 
 
 178  Group-serving bias, characterized by coordinated action towards a common goal by 
members of a specific group or coalition, is yet another source of bias that impacts all sorts 
of decision-making within the forensic science community.  It is one of the dangers and risks 
of having the process for developing forensic standards controlled by members of the law 
enforcement community or any other coalitional alliance, especially when it comes to the 
development of standards recommending minimum training requirements for practitioners 
such as forensic document examiners.  This became apparent with the closure of ASTM 
Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents, which ensued after private sector voting 
members of E30.02 and other interested stakeholders filed appeals and registered complaints 
alleging that a coalition of E30.02 subcommittee members affiliated with government 
agencies and government-sponsored membership organizations were violating ASTM due 
process requirements and federal antitrust laws prohibiting unfair trade practices.  See Andrew 
Sulner, A Critical Look at Some Needed Reforms in the Landscape of Forensic Science 
Education and Mentorship Training Standards, 24 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 73 
(2014); Vickie Willard, ASTM Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences: The History of 
Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents, ASS’N FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS 
(2013), http://afde.org/resources/The-History-of-E30-02.pdf.   
 179  National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996), directs that except where inconsistent with applicable law or 
otherwise impractical, all federal agencies and departments must use technical standards that 
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, in lieu of creating 
proprietary, non-consensus “in-house” standards. 
 180  See Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Why Do We Need an SDO If We Have the OSAC?, 
ACAD. NEWS (Aug. 4, 2016), https://news.aafs.org/asb-news/why-do-we-need-an-sdo-if-we-
have-the-osac/; AAFS Standards Board, https://asb.aafs.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
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standards and by promoting the adoption of those standards by the forensic 
science community.”181 
i. Handwriting Examinations: The Need for Standards to 
Incorporate Practical Measures Designed to Reduce the 
Potential for Cognitive Bias 
 
Reducing the Likelihood that Cognitive Bias Will Taint the Examiner 
 
  ASTM E2290, Standard Guide for the Examination of Handwritten 
Items, was the only consensus standard adopted by the FDE profession that 
set forth best practice guidelines for performing forensic handwriting 
examinations.182  First published in 2003, it was reviewed once thereafter in 
2007, and republished by ASTM without any substantive change from the 
2003 version.  E2290 expired without renewal upon the closure of 
subcommittee E30.02 in 2012, but it has since been republished as SWGDOC 
Standard for Examination of Handwritten Items, which contains the same 
language as the E2290 standard, apparently with the permission of ASTM 
International.  Each of these published versions of a Standard Guide for the 
Examination of Handwritten Items fails to mention, let alone suggest, the 
implementation of protocols designed to reduce potentially biasing 
influences, especially contextual bias.183 
The FDE community’s resistance to implementing bias control measures 
as standard protocol may be attributable to the fact that there are still far too 
many FDEs who remain adamant in their belief that everything is relevant to 
the tasks they perform, or that proper training and experience, or board 
certification, renders them immune from being influenced by task-irrelevant 
case information. Or, it may simply result from the natural tendency of 
human beings to take comfort in knowing that their subjective opinions 
(“expert” or not) are confirmed by independent facts they believe to be true 
at the time, even though those facts may subsequently prove to be false, such 
as an eyewitness account or a defendant’s confession. 
      At the very least, I believe the concept of sequential unmasking needs to 
be accepted and implemented as a standard protocol for forensic handwriting 
investigations, with guidelines established for identifying what types of 
 
 181  The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organizati
on-scientific-area-committees-osac (last updated Mar. 13, 2018). 
 182  See ASTM Int’l, ASTM E2290-07a: Standard Guide for Examination of Handwritten 
Items (2007), https://www.astm.org/Standards/E2290.htm; Sci. Working Grp. for Forensic 
Document Examination, SWGDOC Standard for Examination of Handwritten Items: Version 
2013-1 (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/10/26/swg
doc_standard_for_examination_of_handwritten_items.pdf. 
 183  Id. 
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information might be deemed to be domain-relevant, and at what stage of the 
evidence evaluation process such information can be properly disclosed to 
the analyst.184  Additionally, FDEs working in the private sector must be 
encouraged to advise and forewarn attorneys and clients at the outset of the 
initial communication discussing their possible retention as an expert, not to 
disclose or imply what the favored outcome is, explaining why such 
“blinding” would be preferable and ultimately in the client’s best interest.  
Examiners working in both the public and private sectors should also make 
every effort to use “blind testing” procedures to further facilitate an objective 
analysis of the evidence and thereby effectively foreclose an opposing 
attorney’s ability to use contextual bias as a means of impeaching otherwise 
credible results and opinions. 
 
“Blind Testing” Protocol Used to Examine Hand Printing in United States 
v. Matusiewicz 
 
        Most recently, the benefits of using blind testing and sequential 
unmasking procedures in performing forensic handwriting examinations 
were expressly acknowledged by both the defense attorneys and the 
prosecutors involved in United States v. Matusiewicz, the nation’s first 
federal prosecution of defendants charged with “cyberstalking resulting in 
death.”185  The defendants were a mother (Lenore), son (David), and 
daughter (Christine), who were indicted under the new federal anti-
cyberstalking statute after the father (Tom) gunned down the son’s ex-wife 
and her friend in a Wilmington, Delaware courthouse lobby in 2013 while 
walking into a child support hearing, before taking his own life.  I was 
retained as a handwriting expert in this case by Edson A. Bostic, Chief 
Federal Public Defender for the District of Delaware, who was representing 
the son, David Matusiewicz.  At the very outset, I advised Mr. Bostic of the 
need to avoid letting me know what his favored outcome is and that, to the 
extent feasible, I be supplied with anonymous hand printing exemplars of 
several individuals for purposes of comparing same to the questioned hand 
printing.  Accordingly, I was provided with digital photographs of four 
documents bearing questioned hand printing (items I designated as Q-1 
through Q-4) and scanned images of documents submitted as bearing hand 
printing exemplars of four writers identified simply as Writers A, B, C, and 
D.186  Based upon my examination of these items, I issued a report dated 
 
 184  See Bryan Found & John Ganas, The Management of Domain Irrelevant Context 
Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & JUST. 154–58 (2013), 
and authorities cited in note 1, supra.   
 185  See Lauren Walker, Family Receives Life in Prison for First-Ever Cyberstalking 
Conviction, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/family-receives-life-
prison-first-ever-cyberstalking-conviction-430833.   
 186  To preserve anonymity of the exemplars, each document bearing known hand printing 
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March 16, 2015 which set forth the basis for my opinions that the hand 
printed entries appearing on item Q-1 were written by Writer C and the hand 
printed entries appearing on items Q-2 through Q-4 were written by Writer 
B. 
        Thereafter, I received a copy of an FBI Laboratory Report of 
Examination dated January 27, 2015, prepared and issued by Daniel P. 
Anderson of the Questioned Documents Unit of the FBI Laboratory in 
Quantico, Virginia.  Upon reading this report, I was shocked to discover that 
Mr. Anderson had reached an inconclusive opinion with respect to who 
authored items Q-2 through Q-4, despite having examined the same 
documents that I had examined, albeit without using a “blind testing” 
protocol.187  This was also when I first learned the identities of Writers A, B. 
C and D, because FDE Anderson was provided with additional known 
writing consisting of compulsory (request) exemplars of hand printing 
specifically identified as having been obtained from David Matusiewicz (the 
son), Lenore Matusiewicz (the mother), and Amy Gonzalez (the daughter), 
as well as additional documents bearing known hand printing exemplars 
attributable to Tom Matusiewicz (the deceased father and “shooter”).  I was 
also curious why six other items submitted to Mr. Anderson as bearing 
questioned hand printing were never examined by him, and why the 
document identified as Q-1 in my March 16, 2015 report was not submitted 
to Anderson (and hence, not referenced in his report).  It was then that I 
learned that the Government was alleging that the “HL” hand printed at the 
top of Q-1 stands for “Hit List,” and the hand printed names appearing 
underneath the “HL included the name of the first federal judge assigned to 
the case, who recused himself on that account. 
        I subsequently examined all documents submitted to FBI examiner 
Anderson that I had not seen before, as well as higher resolution color 
flatbed-scanned images of documents that I had previously received in the 
form of photos taken with a digital camera.  Based upon my examination of 
these additional items, I prepared a second report dated June 16, 2015, 
wherein I confirmed my conclusion that Writer B, now identified as Lenore 
Matusiewicz, authored items Q-2 through Q-4, and that Writer C, now 
identified as Tom Matusiewicz, authored item Q-1 as well as the six hand 
printed items (designated by me as Q-5 through Q-10) that were submitted 
to Anderson but never examined by him. 
        During my testimony, I used numerous illustrative charts to aid the jury 
in observing the hand printing features that supported my opinions, and 
stated, “quite frankly . . . any expert with basic elementary training would 
 
was redacted to remove any information that could identify the writer.   
 187  The FBI Lab Report failed to provide any explanation or reason(s) why the 
handwriting analyst (Anderson) concluded that the hand printing evidence submitted for 
analysis was insufficient to render an opinion.   
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have reached the same conclusion I did.”188  My expertise and opinions were 
never challenged by the Government.  But even more remarkable was the 
following exchange that took place in the presence of the jury at the end of 
my very brief cross-examination by Assistant United States Attorney 
Edward J. McAndrew, a federal prosecutor with extensive trial experience 
in high profile cases who, at the time, was the Justice Department’s 
Cybercrime Coordinator and national security cybercrime specialist: 
 
Q.        All right. And my last question for you, Mr. Sulner, is 
should we need to hire you in the future, can we reach you at this 
address? 
 
A.        Yes, sir. 
 
Mr. McAndrew:        Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.189 
 
        After the case was concluded, Mr. Bostic wrote me a letter in which he 
indicated his unequivocal support for the blind testing/sequential unmasking 
protocol I utilized: 
 
I thank you for the excellent work you did on my client’s behalf 
in the above captioned matter. Over my 30 years of litigation, I 
have worked with numerous experts, including other forensic 
document examiners, architects and engineers, medical doctors, 
psychologists, accident reconstruction experts, arson 
investigators, construction management consultants, and 
securities and other fraud experts, to name a few.  Your 
commitment, professionalism and thoroughness were at the 
highest level of any expert with whom I have ever worked. 
The most significant and impressive contribution you made to our 
case by far, however, was your introduction of blind testing. This 
was my first exposure to blind testing. Your insistence upon 
utilizing this methodology clearly carried the day with respect to 
the reliability of the findings and conclusions you reached and 
testified to during trial.  As you may recall, after presenting your 
direct testimony, the government stood only to concede and 
acknowledge the accuracy and significance of your findings, 
while noting that they may want to use your services and/or your 
 
 188  Transcript of Trial Testimony at 5195, United States v. Matusiewicz, 165 F. Supp. 3d 
166 (D. Del. 2015) (on file with author).   
 189  Id. at 5200. During the court recess that immediately followed my testimony, Mr. 
McAndrew informed me that he asked me the last question because he wanted the record to 
reflect that he and his fellow prosecutors disagreed with the inconclusive opinion(s) provided 
by the FBI’s document examiner and considered my identification of the two writers to be 
reliable and accurate.  
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blind testing procedures in other similar matters going forward.  
Of all the experts that we used or sought to admit at trial, your 
report and testimony was the only one which the Government did 
not challenge.  Such concession, on critical documents in evidence 
in this case, was essential to our defense theory and particularly 
noteworthy given the FBI’s inconclusive findings based upon 
their expert’s examination of the very same evidence you 
examined and about which you testified.  Therefore, I thank you 
again for your hard work and dedication to my client’s case. . . .190 
 
ii. Handwriting Examinations: The Need to Delineate the 
Decision-Making Stages Involved in the Examination 
and Evaluation Process 
 
Specifying (“Mapping Out”) the Steps Involved in the Examination and 
Evaluation Process 
 
        Both ASTM E2290 and its SWGDOC counterpart were too vague in 
describing the procedures involved in the forensic examination of 
handwritten items; they failed to address the various critical decisions that 
are commonly made by examiners in the examination and interpretive phases 
of performing forensic handwriting examinations.  In 1999, the Journal of 
Forensic Document Examination published a Modular Method for 
Examining Handwriting (The Modular Method) that formed the framework 
of the forensic handwriting methodology used by government laboratories 
in Australia and New Zealand, as recommended by the Document 
Examination Specialist Advisory Group (DocSAG) of Australia and New 
Zealand.191  The Modular Method provided a series of modules describing 
the nature of each decision to be made by an examiner at each stage of the 
examination process, with a flow chart summarizing the decision-making 
stages within each module.  SWGDOC considered adopting this type of 
modular approach in 2000 when it submitted its initial draft of a proposed 
standard for examining handwritten items.  However, that idea was 
abandoned and has never been seriously reconsidered until recently, 
undoubtedly precipitated by the invaluable input provided by the late Dr. 
Bryan Found while a member of the NIST-OSAC Expert Working Group on 
Human Factors in Handwriting Examination, and the publication in the 
 
 190  Letter from Edson A. Bostic, Del. Fed. Pub. Defender, to author (Sept. 11, 2015) (on 
file with author).   
 191  Bryan Found & Doug Rogers, Documentation of Forensic Handwriting Comparison 
and Identification Method: A Modular Approach, 12 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 
1 (1999). 
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Journal of Forensic Document Examination of The Modular Forensic 
Handwriting Method (2016 Version), an extensive update of the prior 1999 
version.192 
      The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method (2016 Version), developed 
by Found, Carolyne Bird, and their colleagues, consists of a series of ten 
modules, the first of which is “The Method Flow Diagram,” a detailed 
process map which summarizes the essential decision-making points and 
options within the handwriting examination/evaluation process.193  Modules 
2 through 10 provide detailed descriptions and graphic illustrations for each 
of the evaluative and interpretive steps that a forensic handwriting analyst 
needs to perform in reaching an opinion or conclusion, including an opinion 
that the handwriting evidence is insufficient to warrant any conclusion. 
These nine modules cover the following topic areas: 
 
Module 2:        Determination of the suitability of questioned and    
                         comparison samples: issues of comparability and  
                         contamination 
Module 3:        Comparison of handwriting samples 
Module 4:        Non-original handwriting 
Module 5:        The assessment of handwriting complexity:  
                         addressing propositions regarding authorship 
Module 6:        Structural and line quality dissimilarities 
Module 7:        Traced writings 
Module 8:         Unnatural handwriting behaviors 
Module 9:        Line quality and skill 
Module 10:       Evidence evaluation and reporting procedures 
 
        The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method (2016 Version) should 
serve as a model for developing a handwriting examination standard that is 
more rigorous and transparent than what the American community of FDEs 
has developed to date, especially since Found and Bird reported positive 
findings from a multi-year study of over 27,000 opinions expressed by 28 
document examiners designed to test the validity of their modular 
approach.194  By requiring examiners to document their decisions for each 
decision point along the continuum of tasks involved in the examination and 
interpretive stages of the process, the modular approach affords a more 
effective and transparent means of evaluating the reliability of the key 
decisions that purportedly support an examiner’s conclusion.  For example, 
one decision point of concern to the FDE community as well as the courts 
 
 192  Bryan Found & Carolyne Bird, The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method 2016 
Version, 26 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 7 (2016).   
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. at 63–70.   
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concerns an examiner’s decision as to whether perceptible differences 
between two sets of writings should be attributable to natural variation (intra-
writer variability), different writers (inter-writer variability), or disguise 
(intentional distortion), especially in view of research indicating that 
presumptively well-trained FDEs have a high error rate when performing 
tasks of this nature.195 
        Developing a robust and transparent American national handwriting 
examination standard along the lines of The Modular Forensic Handwriting 
Method (2016 Version) would serve to alleviate some of the criticisms 
directed at the subjectivity of forensic handwriting examination as well as 
improve the accuracy and strengthen the probative value of handwriting 
identification opinions expressed by trained examiners. 
iii. Handwriting Identification Opinions: The Need to Establish 
More Meaningful and Appropriate Language for 
Expressing Qualitative Levels of Confidence (Certitude) 
        The problems associated with document examiners using different 
terminology in  reporting the results of handwriting comparisons was 
brought to the forefront in a series of articles written by McAlexander, Ellen, 
and Purdy in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.196  Their suggested language 
for use in expressing handwriting identification opinions was later presented 
in a 1991 article published as a Letter to the Editor in the Journal of Forensic 
Sciences that proposed the use of a nine-level scale comprising terms for 
expressing subjective (non-quantified) estimates of probability with respect 
to handwriting identification opinions.197  The 1991 article was adopted as 
recommended guidelines in reports and testimony by the Questioned 
Document Section of the AAFS and the ABFDE.198  The nine-level scale 
consisted of a positive category of four rank-ordered expressions of 
confidence level—identification (definitely did write), strong probability did 
write, probably did write, and indications (evidence to suggest) may have 
written; a neutral category—inconclusive (no conclusion); and a negative 
category of the corresponding four rank-ordered levels of confidence— 
 
 195  See D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification 
Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477, 549 (2008).   
 196  Thomas V. McAlexander, The Meaning of Handwriting Opinions, 5 J. POLICE SCI. & 
ADMIN. 43 (1977); D.M. Ellen, The Expression of Conclusions in Handwriting Examination, 
12 CANADIAN SOC’Y FORENSIC SCI. J. 117 (1979); Dan C. Purdy, The Requirements of 
Effective Report Writing for Document Examiners, 15 CANADIAN SOC’Y FORENSIC SCI. J. 146 
(1982).   
 197  Thomas V. McAlexander, Jan Beck & Ronald M. Dick, The Standardization of 
Handwriting Opinion Terminology, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 311, 314–16 (1991).  
 198  Id. at 311.  These guidelines were later incorporated in a consensus standard first 
published in 1996 as ASTM Standard E-1658, Standard Terminology for Expressing 
Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners.   
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elimination (definitely did not write), strong probability did not write, 
probably did not write, and indications (evidence to suggest) may not have 
written. 
        On February 28, 1995, ABFDE Diplomate Mary Wenderoth Kelly 
testified at a Daubert hearing in United States v. Starzecpyzel199 about the 
FDE profession’s adoption of the nine-level scale as the standard 
terminology to be used by FDEs in reporting the results of handwriting 
examinations.200  United States District Court Judge McKenna of the 
Southern District of New York was unimpressed; he rejected the nine-level 
scale, finding that it is highly subjective and imprecise and can easily lead to 
misleading and improper testimony.201 
        Undaunted by Judge McKenna’s April 3, 1995 decision in Starzecpyzel, 
on September 10, 1995, ASTM Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned 
Documents voted to approve the nine-level scale as a consensus standard for 
expressing handwriting identification opinions, and it was officially 
published in April 1996 as ASTM Standard E1658-05, Standard 
Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners. 
Subsequently, the original 1996 version of E1658 was reviewed and 
republished without any substantive changes in 1997, 2004 and 2008. From 
1996 until now, ASTM E1658 has been routinely cited by FDEs as the 
profession’s consensus standard for expressing handwriting identification 
opinions in reports and testimony. 
        When I first read Judge McKenna’s decision in Starzecpyzel, I was 
relieved to see that a prominent jurist shared the same concerns about 
vagueness and unreliability that I had expressed in negative votes and 
comments whenever ASTM E1658 came up for discussion and review as an 
ASTM standard.  What was most troubling to me as a lawyer and a forensic 
document examiner was that ASTM E1658 sanctioned testimony “that there 
is evidence which indicates (or suggests) that the John Doe of the known 
material may have written the questioned materials but the evidence falls far 
short of that necessary to support a definite conclusion”202  The “Discussion” 
paragraph inserted as a note immediately following the definition of 
“indications” in each and every published version of the ASTM E1658 
standard contained the following caveat: 
 
This is a very weak opinion, and a report may be misinterpreted 
to be an identification by some readers if the report simply states, 
“The evidence indicates that the John Doe of the known material 
wrote the questioned material.” There should always be additional 
 
 199  United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).   
 200  Id. at 1028.   
 201  Id. at 1048.   
 202  ASTM INT’L, ASTM E1658-08 2 § 4.1(2008).   
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limiting words or phrases (such as “may have” or “but the 
evidence is far from conclusive”) when this opinion is reported, to 
ensure that the reader understands that the opinion is weak. Some 
examiners doubt the desirability of reporting an opinion this 
vague, and certainly they cannot be criticized if they eliminate this 
terminology. But those examiners who are trying to encompass 
the entire “gray scale” of degrees of confidence may wish to use 
this or a similar term.203 
 
Unfortunately, my FDE colleagues in ASTM failed to appreciate my 
objection that this type of handwriting opinion is so weak and vague that its 
probative value is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect204 because 
fact finders are likely to overvalue such a weak and speculative opinion.  My 
unwavering objection to the admissibility in evidence of such a “low level 
of confidence” opinion was reinforced by the lessons I learned from my 
many years of casework (not to mention the lessons handed down from my 
mother and her father, Professor Julius Fischhof), as well as my training in 
the law, all of which taught me that this type of opinion amounts to no more 
than a guess, and rarely an educated one given the subjectivity of forensic 
handwriting analysis.  On those rare occasions when an objection was raised 
by an attorney, some courts have likewise been troubled by the inherent 
unreliability of an “indications opinion,” either excluding it altogether or 
imposing restrictions on it.205 
        In 2009, the FBI announced, to my great satisfaction, that the ASTM 
“indications” expression would no longer be allowed and that such levels of 
confidence must be reported as “no conclusion.”206  At the same time, the 
FBI laboratory announced that it would be using a five-level scale for 
expressing handwriting identification opinions instead of the nine-level scale 
contained in the ASTM E1658 standard.207  The FBI’s five-level scale 
contained a positive category permitting only two possible expressions 
(“identification” and “may have written”), the standard neutral category (“no 
 
 203  Id. 
 204  See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”).   
 205  See, e.g., Barnett v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., No. 06-2171, 2007 WL 7611185 
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007); People v. Todman, 53 V.I. 431 (2010).   
 206  See Diana Harrison, Ted M. Burkes & Danielle P. Seiger, FBI, Handwriting 
Identification: Meeting the Challenge of Science and the Law, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Oct. 
2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/o
ct2009/review/2009_10_review02.htm.   
 207  See DEP’T OF JUST., PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS 
FOR THE FORENSIC HANDWRITING ANALYSIS DISCIPLINE 1,  https://www.justice.gov/archive
s/dag/file/877746/download (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
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conclusion”), and a negative category of two possible expressions 
(“elimination” and “may not have written”).208  Clearly, this was a significant 
and welcome improvement from my perspective. 
        To date, there is still no uniform standard for expressing handwriting 
identification opinions in reports and testimony.  Indeed, even the FBI and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have conflicting views on this subject.  The 
DOJ recently issued a document titled Department of Justice Proposed 
Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Handwriting 
Analysis Discipline, which, if adopted, would “apply to Department of 
Justice personnel who perform examinations and/or provide expert witness 
testimony regarding the forensic examination of handwriting evidence.”209  
On its face, the DOJ proposal lists a five-level scale consisting of a positive 
category of two opinion levels (“identification” and “qualified opinion(s) did 
not write”); the standard neutral category (“no conclusion”); and a negative 
category of two levels (“elimination” and “qualified opinion(s) did not 
write”).210 However, the proposal then states that “[t]he strength or weakness 
of a (positive) qualified opinion will be provided by the use of any of the 
following terms: “Strong Probability Did Write, Probably Did Write, and 
Indications May Have Written,” and the corresponding negative of these 
three expressions may be used to express the strength or weakness of a 
negative qualified opinion.211  By doing so, the DOJ proposal seeks to 
reinstate the nine-level scale of ASTM E1658 that was specifically rejected 
by the FBI. 
        Clearly, the FDE community needs to address this critical divide by 
doing some serious soul-searching before deciding upon the appropriate 
uniform language for expressing handwriting identification opinions in 
reports and testimony.  In my view, objective and reasonable minds will, at 
the very least, agree that the highly problematic and speculative 
“indications” opinion should not be allowed. 
        In the same vein, serious consideration needs to be given to proposals 
suggesting the avoidance altogether of the term “identification” or any other 
categorical conclusion regarding source attribution in favor of expressing 
conclusions in terms of the degree of support that exists for one proposition 
over another. This school of thought is predicated upon the fact that as with 
every other forensic pattern-matching discipline, the handwriting analyst 
begins with two alternative propositions (hypotheses) when comparing sets 
of questioned and known handwriting: (1) the two sets came from the same 
source (writer) or (2) the two sets came from different sources (writers). 
Essentially, it allows the analyst to make a subjective assessment of the 
 
 208  Id.   
 209  Id. at 1–2.   
 210  Id. 
 211  Id. 
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strength of the evidence in support of one proposition over the other 
proposition based upon the analyst’s observations from examining and 
comparing the evidence. This school of thought has found support among 
forensic document examiners in Australia and New Zealand,212 and in the 
2012 Report of the NIST Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent 
Print Analysis, which recommended that latent print examiners avoid 
categorical conclusions about whether two sets of prints have a common 
source and use a more moderate expression such as, “it is far more probable 
that this degree of similarity would occur when comparing the latent print 
with the defendants’ fingers than with someone else’s fingers.”213 
        For me, prohibiting the “indications” opinion is essential, whereas 
eliminating the “identification” opinion is not, so long as it is explained to 
mean that the extensive degree of similarity observed in the handwriting 
features of the questioned and known writing warrants the belief that the only 
plausible explanation for such a concurrence is that the questioned and 
known writing have a common source.  As I noted in Part II.C, supra, 
demonstrable evidence of shared characteristics between two sets of 
handwritings can provide a strong basis for a reasonable person to find that 
both sets of writings were made by the same person beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
        Going forward, I firmly believe the FDE community needs to be more 
open to developing a standard for expressing opinions in reports and 
testimony that requires experts to (a) consider all the possibilities that might 
have accounted for the observed evidence; (b) explain why one possibility is 
more or less plausible than another; and (c) use qualitative probabilistic 
statements that more accurately convey the degree of support the observed 
evidence provides in favor of one proposition (possibility) over one or more 
alternative propositions (possibilities). 
        Finally, careful thought should be given to recasting the terms of the 
conclusions from a system of “words of estimative probability” to a system 
of “words of estimative surprise,” consistent with and guided by Professor 
Risinger’s insights on this issue reflected in his contribution to this 
symposium.214  Professor Risinger’s proposed system of estimative surprise 
would include a rank-order scale of words such as “mildly surprised,” 
“surprised,” “quite surprised,” “greatly surprised,” “astonished,” “shocked,” 
etc.215  After reading his article, another thought came to me that might also 
 
 212  See Found & Bird, supra note 192, at 59.   
 213  Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis. Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2012), at 134.   
 214  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018).   
 215  Id. (manuscript at 19) (on file with author).   
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be worth pursuing, and that is to correlate each term of expression used in a 
scale of estimative probability with a corresponding term of expression used 
in a scale of estimative surprise, thereby providing a form of expression for 
an expert to use in “describing” or “defining” the level of confidence to be 
associated with the estimative probability opinion he or she has expressed in 
a given case.  Thus, for example, if an examiner concluded that the John Doe 
of the known writing did write the questioned writing (an identification), this 
conclusion would have to be annotated with (accompanied by) a statement 
such as: “In reaching this conclusion, the examiner is saying that he would 
be shocked to learn that John Doe did not, in fact, write the questioned 
writing”; if an examiner concluded that the John Doe of the known writing 
may have written the questioned writing, this conclusion would have to be 
accompanied by a statement such as: “In reaching this conclusion, the 
examiner is saying that he would be mildly surprised to learn that John Doe 
did not, in fact, write the questioned writing.”  Upon reflection, I believe 
using both forms of expression (“estimative probability” and “estimative 
surprise”) may provide a more transparent and reliable measure of the 
subjective level of confidence an expert has in his or her conclusion 
(opinion), and one which would be more easily understood by a lay juror, 
and perhaps even a judge.  In any event, this issue should be explored through 
research studies carefully designed to evaluate how experts, judges, and lay 
persons (prospective jurors) interpret these various kinds of subjective 
expressions of expert belief (confidence). 
iv. Support for and Cooperation with Properly Designed Black 
Box Studies 
        All forensic feature-comparison disciplines involve a subjective 
method in which perceptions and interpretations of evidence rest solely 
within the observer-analyst’s mind and only the conclusions derived from 
such perceptions and interpretations are known.  Black box studies are 
empirical studies used to estimate the reliability of a subjective method, such 
as forensic handwriting analysis. 
        Unfortunately, the discipline of forensic handwriting analysis still lacks 
robust, ground truth studies that provide empirical support for the reliability 
of many of the tasks routinely performed by its practitioners, such as 
distinguishing between forged and disguised (genuine but deliberately 
modified) signatures.  Moreover, the proficiency tests that FDEs take 
annually or biannually as a requirement for maintaining their individual 
certification or their laboratory’s accreditation status have been criticized as 
being too easy, not reflective of actual casework, or susceptible to test-takers 
colluding with one another or otherwise receiving unauthorized assistance.  
Hence, if the FDE community is serious about seeking to obtain trustworthy 
empirical data that supports the reliability of the opinions they express from 
preforming specific handwriting examination tasks, they first need to 
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develop a comprehensive laundry list of all such tasks.  Once this is done, 
empirical black box studies can be properly designed to obtain data for 
assessing how well FDEs perform each of those tasks. Such black box 
studies should be conducted by academic researchers who have no real or 
apparent interest in the outcome of any such black box studies. 
        The FDE community should unite in their efforts to support and 
cooperate with all academic researchers conducting such black box studies, 
as resistance to doing so will only provide more fodder for the discipline’s 
critics. 
        If the FDE community decides to use the Modular Forensic 
Handwriting Method described in Part VII.A.2.b., supra, or a modified 
version of same, white box studies should also be considered, since such 
studies are designed to understand the factors that affect an examiner’s 
decision at each decision point of the examination process. White box studies 
can be extremely useful in determining sources of error for those tasks for 
which black box studies produce high rates of inter-examiner variability (or 
even intra-examiner variability). 
B. Lawyers and Gatekeepers Need to Be Better Informed and More 
Diligent in Scrutinizing an Expert’s Methodology 
1. The Trial Lawyer 
        Trial lawyers need to be more proactive and make more frequent use of 
in limine motions in seeking to exclude proffered handwriting identification 
opinion evidence that is unreliable.  This necessarily entails having 
knowledge of the methodological principles and consensus standards that 
have been adopted by the profession for the specific handwriting task at issue 
in the case. 
        In preparing for a Daubert hearing or a trial, the lawyer must study the 
learned treatises relied upon by practitioners and all the standards adopted 
by the profession that are relevant to the handwriting task(s) at hand.  Even 
with such baseline knowledge, lawyers frequently remain ill-equipped to 
mount an effective challenge to unreliable evidence proffered by a 
handwriting expert adept at obfuscating issues affecting the reliability of 
their opinions.  Hence, lawyers need to consult with subject matter experts 
at the pre-trial stage and not rely solely on their cross-examination skills at a 
Daubert hearing or at trial.  Presentation of contradictory expert testimony 
by a well-credentialed and experienced expert is always preferable and more 
effective in providing trial judges with the necessary baseline level of 
confidence to find that a proffered handwriting expert’s testimony as related 
to the task at hand is so unfounded or illogical as to warrant finding it 
unreliable and inadmissible. 
        Reasonable access to the expertise required to expose critically flawed 
and unreliable proffered expert testimony is an issue of critical importance, 
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
716 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631 
especially in criminal cases, where the defense customarily has inadequate 
financial resources to obtain such expertise, notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of a constitutional right to expert assistance.216  Trial 
judges may be able to remedy this inequity of resources by authorizing the 
payment of reasonable expert fees for the retention of high-quality experts 
by the defense, something that is generally not as great a concern for the 
prosecution.217  However, this invariably requires a motion on the part of the 
defense attorney, optimally at the early stages of the case. 
2. The Trial Judge 
        Judges need to take their gatekeeping role more seriously.  All too often 
they forego their mandatory duty to screen and exclude proffered opinion 
evidence that is unreliable and inadmissible in favor of allowing the 
traditional safeguards of cross-examination and presentation of contrary 
evidence to expose the unreliability of an expert’s opinion and trial 
testimony.  Unfortunately, these two safeguards of our adversarial system 
rest upon the trial lawyer’s skill level and the availability of resources to hire 
a well-qualified and experienced rebuttal expert, neither of which are 
assured.  Hence, the gatekeeping role is of utmost importance in preventing 
unreliable opinion evidence from reaching the fact finder. 
        The cause for concern in relying upon gatekeepers to exclude unreliable 
opinion evidence is that most trial judges are not technically proficient when 
it comes to most forensic science disciplines.  They have generally not been 
exposed to, or trained to identify, the kinds of flaws in examining or 
evaluating evidence that produce unreliable and exaggerated expert 
opinions, even in the case of pattern-matching disciplines such as 
handwriting analysis.  Unless judges appreciate and comprehend the 
reliability issues involved in challenges to proffered opinion evidence, it is 
unlikely that those issues will be addressed in a meaningful way. 
        To facilitate and enhance the performance of their gatekeeping 
responsibility, as outlined in Part VI, supra, judges should consider 
implementing the following practical measures to assist the court in 
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence: 
 
 216  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–87 (1985).  See also Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. 
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1305 (2003).   
 217  See James Fanelli, Manhattan DA’s Office Paid Unbelievable Amount to Psychiatrist 
Who Assessed Convicted Etan Patz Killer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2017), http://www.nyd
ailynews.com/new-york/prosecutors-paid-massive-amount-expert-etan-patz-case-article-1.3
367894.  The New York Daily News reported, having learned through a Freedom of 
Information Law request that “the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office paid a forensic 
psychiatrist $536,940 for his work as an expert witness in the two trials of Etan Patz’s killer” 
whereas “[the defendant’s] court-appointed attorneys and paralegals were paid a total of 
$803,000 according to the city Finance Department.” Id.   
SULNER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  8:04 PM 
2018] A DOCUMENT EXAMINER TELLS ALL 717 
a) routinely issue pre-trial orders directing all experts to 
submit written reports or affidavits detailing the 
reasoning and methods underlying their opinions; and 
b) appoint a court-appointed subject matter expert in those 
instances when the specialized knowledge of a 
nonpartisan expert would assist the court in properly 
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
        Has there been progress since the 2009 NAS Report?  Yes, but not 
enough, despite the NIST-OSAC efforts to improve the various disciplines 
of forensic science, especially those involved in the examination and 
comparison of features associated with physical or trace evidence.  The FDE 
community has engaged in a lot of talk, but far too little action, and the 
problems associated with the reliability of handwriting identification opinion 
evidence, as described and illustrated in this Article, still prevail. 
        Hopefully the information provided in the first five parts of this Article 
will encourage and ignite members of the FDE community, as well as 
members of the bench and the bar, to become more proactive in addressing 
and resolving the critical issues that continue to adversely affect the 
reliability of handwriting identification opinion evidence by, at the very 
least, implementing the changes recommended in Part VII of this Article. 
 
